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Abstract 
In contemporary conflict environments, security and development are inextricably 
linked. This has spawned the development of the comprehensive approach to 
peace support operations. But there is a deficit of studies validating that 
integration and coherence will lead to positive outcomes and higher degrees of 
effectiveness. There is also a gap between strategic planning and operative 
implementation.  
The aims of this thesis are to develop an analytical framework for monitoring 
and evaluation and test it in a case study to investigate the role of integration, 
coherence and cooperation in the production of positive outcomes. Based on the 
method of process-tracing, an interactive perspective on structure and agency and 
theories on the civil – military dilemma, a reflexive analytical framework is 
developed to analyse the UN mission in Liberia in the transition period from 2003 
– 2006. Based on the analytical model the case is divided into three phases and 
analysed accordingly. 
 The conclusions are that cooperation enabled by integrated structures is a 
primary driver producing positive outcomes in the operational setting, while lack 
of strategic coherence hampers the transition to long-term positive outcomes. 
The analytical framework is a useful tool for monitoring, but needs to be 
complemented with evaluation tools.  
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1 Introduction 
New conflict patterns, new solutions  
 
Since the end of the cold war, the dominant patterns of conflict are changing. The 
classic inter-state war is giving headway to civil wars and violent conflict in the 
shadow of state failure, humanitarian crises and deep social cleavages. In this 
complex conflict environment arises the need for humanitarian interventions, 
peace enforcement and conflict transformation. But the changing patterns of 
conflict also place demands on changing patterns of conflict management. 
Operations often take place in fragile or failed states, with a wide range of goals 
beyond humanitarian relief and security stabilisation. In these complex situations, 
security and development are inextricably linked (Nilsson et al 2008b:13). This 
has spawned new strategic thinking to how the ends, ways and means in 
contemporary conflict should be conceptualized. These new lines of thought can 
be clustered in the formation of the comprehensive or whole-of-government 
approach.  
The evolvement of a comprehensive approach to peace-support operations is 
based on the broad understanding, present among international organisations as 
well as individual nations, that the new complex security environment requires a 
broad, multifunctional engagement (Nilsson et al 2008a:12).  
This realisation opens up new venues for dealing with complex conflicts, but 
several questions are still to be answered concerning the planning and 
implementation of a multifunctional approach. The why question seems relatively 
clear, given the acute needs in conflict environments, but the how question is still 
elusive. What form should this integration take to effectively deal with the 
complex and multidimensional conflict situations present in the contemporary 
setting? 
There is a gap between strategic planning and multifunctional implementation, 
and further studies need to be conducted to identify mechanisms enabling and 
leading to multifunctional cooperation and coordination, from the strategic level 
to the field level (Nilsson et al 2008b:6). There is also a deficit in studies 
supporting the accepted notion that coherence and integration will lead to higher 
effectiveness and positive outcomes (Nilsson et al 2008b:14). This is due to a lack 
of effective tools for monitoring and evaluating the progress of multifunctional 
operations, creating analytical gaps between policy, implementation, output and 
outcome. These complex crises, with numerous interconnected variables, makes it 
difficult to trace and isolate causal relations producing outcome, thus warranting 
an increased academic focus on this problematic area of inquiry (Nilsson et al 
2008a:65-70). As the humanitarian problems and deteriorating security situation 
in conflict zones continues to mount, there is a growing need for clarifying the 
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impact of integrated approaches. The analytical gap between planning, 
implementation and outcome in complex interventions warrants an increased 
focus on this problematic area of inquiry.  
1.1 Outline of the thesis  
Based on the deficit identified in recent research discussed above concerning 
methods for monitoring and evaluation (Nilsson et al 2008b:10), this thesis first 
consists of a theory-evolving part where a model for analysing the intervention 
process from planning to outcome is created using different theoretical strands. 
The second part is theory testing, where the model is tested in a case study. 
The aim of this thesis is twofold, namely to develop and test an analytical 
framework able to trace the process from different forms of cooperative action to 
the production of outcomes in the operation environment, and secondly to 
investigate if cooperative action leads to positive outcomes. This is important, 
since there is a lack of studies verifying the broadly accepted assumption that 
coherence and integration will lead to higher effectiveness and positive outcomes 
(Nilsson et al 2008a:14).  
A very important stipulation based on this assertion is that the case studied is 
an intervention as a special case of an inter-agency implementation process. 
In sum, this thesis is a theory evolving and theory testing case study utilizing 
process tracing as an overarching methodological tool to develop an analytical 
framework for monitoring and evaluation, and to test the hypothesis that 
cooperative action will lead to better outcomes (more on this below).  
1.2 Research question 
Based on the introduction and outline above, the question to address in this thesis 
is: 
 
What is the role of integration, coherence and cooperation between 
multidimensional actors in the production of positive outcomes in peace support 
operations? 
1.3 Working hypothesis 
As stated earlier, an important reason to investigate the role of cooperation in the 
production of outcomes is because there is a broadly accepted assertion that 
coherence and integration will lead to higher effectiveness and positive outcomes, 
  3 
which is not fully verified through research. Thus, a working hypothesis of this 
thesis to be tested is that: 
 
Coherence, integration and cooperation in the intervention process will lead to 
positive outcomes.  
1.4 Theory of science: Scientific realism 
An important step in outlining this thesis and choosing area of interest is to 
venture from a basic theory of science.  
I will work with scientific realism as the basis for my thesis. For this section I 
draw upon the causal realism of Thomas Brante, but also modified it a bit by 
introducing ideas by Colin Wight.  
A first point of departure when conducting research is what constitutes 
science. As stated by Brante, science “…seek to identify the basic and durable 
mechanisms upon which surface phenomena rely.” (Brante 2001:175). This aim is 
also a good starting point for my inquiry, as I want to uncover the processes and 
mechanisms linking multidimensional cooperation to outcome in terms of 
operational effect. Thinking of science in terms of uncovering causal linkages and 
underlying mechanisms is a useful stance for investigating the role of cooperation 
in a process leading to outcomes in an intervention.   
 Realism, to enable the aims listed above, takes it starting point in a 
number of postulates or assumptions about ontology, epistemology and method, 
which are the basic vantage points for producing scientific knowledge (These 
postulates are taken from causal realism (Brante 2001:172):  
 
• The first postulate is that there is a reality existing independently of 
our representations or awareness of it (ontological postulate) 
• There is a social reality existing independently of social scientists’ 
representations or awareness of it (ontological postulate for social 
science). 
• It is possible to achieve knowledge about this reality (epistemological 
postulate). 
• All knowledge is fallible – and correctable (methodological postulate). 
 
I believe scientific realism provides the framework for open-ended scientific 
inquiry, which I regard as a necessity to thoroughly investigate a process of 
complex interacting events such as an intervention. 
1.4.1 Causality 
A crucial concept originating from the aim of science in realism is causality. If we 
are to find explanations to surface phenomena and identify durable mechanism 
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upon which events in social reality rely, we need to clarify the concept of 
causality, how the social reality is connected in cause and effect.  
What configuration of causality is it that allows us to reach the aim of science 
as stated above, and for me to conduct my inquiry? To start, social science is 
always produced as a part of an open system. This means that we need to leave 
both the uncovering of law-like regularities and predictive models, to focus on 
explanation of unfolding events and phenomena, instead of predicting it (Wight 
2006:52). Causality adjusted to these open systems is better described as 
tendencies that may or may not manifest themselves given the interaction between 
counteracting tendencies (Wight 2006:51-52). This is causality without laws 
(Brante 2001:174). It fits the type of causality I expect to encounter in the analysis 
of the case. I believe the causal chains will be complex, where several conditions 
and causal chains converge to produce outcome, in interaction (George & Bennett 
2005:212).  
1.5 Research design 
1.5.1 Building block case study 
This case study is a “building block” study (George & Bennett 2005:75-76), since 
a particular class of a phenomenon is being studied, and adds a dimension to 
existing research by elaborating and testing research tools on undertheorised areas 
of inquiry. This study is intended as a building block in a structure of existing 
research within the field of civil – military relations in interventions.  
1.5.2 General method: Process tracing 
The method of process tracing is a useful tool for tracing causality in single cases, 
and moving beyond covariance to investigate complex causality (George & 
Bennett 2005:224). It is also a powerful tool for developing and testing theory in 
single case studies (George & Bennett 2005:213). It is best described as detective 
work, where evidence is investigated and put in sequence and compared to 
hypotheses, to generate an explanation of the sequence of events producing effect 
(George & Bennett 2005:217-219). Therefore, it is a useful method in this thesis. 
To summarize what process tracing as a method entails, it is worth quoting from 
George & Bennett at length: 
 
“To identify the process, one must perform the difficult cognitive feat of figuring 
out which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which 
simple principles of the many that may be at work, would have combined to 
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generate the observed sequence of events.” (George & Bennett 2005:206, 
emphasis added) 
 
What process tracing basically is about and is useful for, is identifying causal 
paths in conditions of complex and interactive causality and equifinality (George 
& Bennett 2005:215). The expected form of causality to be encountered in my 
case study is complex and interacting. Type of causality embedded in the 
phenomenon under study guides the selection of method and type of process 
tracing (George & Bennett 2005:213). The kind of process tracing employed in 
this thesis is what George & Bennett calls the “analytic explanation” (2005:211). 
Here, detailed narratives are converted into an analytical causal explanation using 
analytical tools and theoretical hypotheses to focus on what is considered a 
particularly important part of the explanation, in this case, the impact of 
cooperation. However, since the casual process must be traced with rigour, the 
analysis will have to be open to alternative paths (George & Bennett 2005:217), 
again, much like detective work. A relevant aim given the use of process tracing 
as overall method is to go beyond the verification or rejection of the hypothesis 
outlined in section 1.3 and move to a specification of the hypothesis, i.e.:  
 
Coherence, integration and cooperation in the intervention process will lead to 
positive outcomes under conditions x and y, but not z.   
 
The challenge of using process tracing is associated with common methodological 
problems. Underspecified hypotheses based on theory in combination with 
incomplete data can make it hard to trace the process, and thus running risks of 
producing false positives, processes that appear to fit the evidence even though 
they are not causal, and false negatives, processes that are causal but does not 
appear to be so (George & Bennett 2005:223). To remedy this, patterns need to be 
specified along the way and tested. 
To operationalise the method of process tracing, I will develop an analytical 
framework making it possible to trace the process in a structured manner. 
1.5.3 Material 
When employing process tracing as a general method, there is a high demand for 
good empirical material, given the detailed and rigorous analytical inquiry that 
needs to be performed. My intention is to use several sources of documentation, 
where existing research and field reports from the relevant case is an important 
source. As described in the previous section, the task of gathering and analysing 
the material can be quite cumbersome, and is best described as laying a puzzle 
with many different pieces. The material available will in large terms determine 
the success of the process-tracing.  
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1.5.4 On causality: the limitation of variable thinking in interactive 
process analysis 
Given my focus on the iterative interaction between structure and agency, 
combining to produce outcome as gradual change, I find the classic 
conceptualization of a casual chain with an independent and dependent variable 
limiting. This has been called the “variable-oriented approaches”, where the 
causal power of a particular variable is established by comparing how it performs 
in different cases (George & Bennett 2005:179). It is limiting due to the narrow 
space given for the possibility of variable interaction and change in values during 
the process. Gradual change is studied, and in empirical terms, when 
implementing projects and operations, the operation environment is changed. Not 
only does this contribute to the end-state, it also means changing the very 
preconditions under which the intervention is set, that enables and constrains 
action. 
In the standard conceptualization of variables, assigning a value to the 
independent variable causing variance in the dependent variable creates a 
straightforward casual chain. But what if the value is changed and the variance in 
the dependent variable is a contributor to this change? How is the whole process 
conceptualized then? I believe it is best viewed as a complex and iterative 
interaction process, causing gradual change that sets the stage for the next round 
of efforts. Thus, outcomes are cumulative in an ideal setting. This leads me to 
conceptualize causality as spiralled, instead of linear, where the operation 
environment (x) enables and constrains agency (y) which in turn changes the 
operation environment (see figure 1 below). For analytical clarity, this spiralled 
causality is studied in phases, where a significant change of the framework (x) 
initiates a new phase. This “feedback loop” conceptualisation is common in 
theoretical frameworks found in policy and implementation literature (Allison & 
Zelikow 1999:145, 275-278, Ostrom in Sabatier 2007:29-30, Zahariadis in 
Sabatier 2007:84, Sabatier & Weible in Sabatier 2007:191), which is an important 
theoretical base for my analytical framework in chapter 4. It has underpinnings 
based on the ontological conceptualization of structure and agency as mutually 
constitutive, and structure as enabling/constraining in relation to agency. This is 
the underlying view of causality for the framework described in chapter 4.  
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Figure 1: Spiral causality 
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2 Theoretical underpinnings 
In this chapter, the aim is to position my thesis theoretically by conducting an 
inquiry of the theoretical underpinnings of civil – military relations.  
Most recent research about civil – military relations is focused on operational 
aspects in the intervention context (see for example Hull 2008, Frerks et al 2006, 
Capstick 2007, de Coning 2007, van Klingeren 2007, Stapleton 2007). This stems 
from the broad interest in, and recognition that complex security crises seen in the 
post cold-war world need a multifunctional engagement (Nilsson et al 2008b:12). 
However, to be able to understand these cooperation dynamics and place them in 
a theoretical setting, the classic dilemma of civil – military relations and the 
different theories developed to address it must be revisited.  
2.1 The civil – military dilemma 
The underlying problem of civil – military relations is, simply put, how does a 
civilian government control its military? To refine the dilemma, the question 
arises from a simple paradox of organized societies: “Because we fear others we 
create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution 
we created for protection.” (Feaver 1996:150). This problem arises when 
organized societies reach the point where there is a division of labour, in this case 
the delegation of authority and coercive power. The civil – military challenge 
arises:  
 
“The civil-military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do 
anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only 
what civilians authorize them to do” (Feaver 1996:149) 
 
The theory evolved to address and mitigate this tension sparked a debate and led 
to two identifiable opposing theoretical strands.  
 
2.1.1 The divided approach to the civil – military dilemma 
This theoretical strand was first outlined in Samuel Huntington´s seminal work 
“The soldier and the state” (1957). In trying to postulate a condition where there is 
a high degree of civilian control and military security (coercive power), 
Huntington identifies two essential shaping forces of the military institutions: The 
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functional imperative, stemming from the threats to a society’s security, and the 
societal imperative arising from the dominant social forces, institutions and 
ideology within a society. Different configurations of these imperatives will lead 
to different configurations of civilian control and military security (Huntington 
1957:2-3). The relationship of interest is that between the officers’ corps and the 
state.  
A crucial aspect of forming viable civil – military relations according to 
Huntington is the professionalization of the military officer corps. This 
professional ethic’s most important feature is the instrumentalist view of the 
military profession, being an apolitical servant to the state (Huntington 1957:79).  
Herein lies the solution to the civil-military dilemma: The professional 
military. This is reached by maintaining a condition, which Huntington describes 
as “objective civilian control” (Huntington 1957:83-85). In this condition, control 
is exercised through the professionalization of the officers’ corps, making them a 
neutral tool of the state. Thus, the military is formed only by the functional 
imperative, the security structure, and not the societal imperative. This means that 
there is only one form of objective civilian control, since the military is only 
shaped by the universal functional imperative, whereas in conditions of subjective 
civilian control, there are many configurations depending on the societal 
imperative and which civilian group is controlling the military (Huntington 
1957:80-83).  
Huntington’s argument can be summarized as follows: “autonomy leads to 
professionalization, which leads to political neutrality and voluntary 
subordination, which leads to secure civilian control” (Feaver cited in Egnell 
2007:45). 
 
2.1.2 The integrated approach to the civil – military dilemma 
Morris Janowitz, stemming from a sociological school of thought, offers one 
strong critique of Huntington’s view of civil – military relations. Janowitz departs 
from the technical and strategic innovations most notably characterized by the 
nuclear bomb. In this structural setting the military professional should be viewed 
as a constabulary force, seeking to uphold viable relations of international security 
(Janowitz 1960:418-420). This requires the professional military to be sensitive to 
politics and policy and able to interpret the political will (Janowitz 1960: 420). 
Ultimately, what divides the approach advocated by Huntington in relation to 
Janowitz is the definition of the professional military, and in analytical terms, 
different views of the functional imperative (se figure 1). The different approaches 
depart from the same mechanisms, but differently constituted (Feaver 1996:165).  
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Figure 2: Difference in theories 
 
According to Janowitz, the professional soldier is sensitive to political will and 
objectives, and this implies a close integration with the civilian institutions 
(Janowitz 1960:420). Ultimately, this means the primacy of the civilian 
institutions to define the functional imperative for the military (Egnell 2007:48-
49).  
2.1.3 A third take: The nature of civil – military relations 
There is also a critique of both the approaches above, mainly concerning the 
concept of professionalism. Feaver (1996) argues that both theories are flawed 
since they define away the very problem they seek to address by including the 
solution in what constitutes the concept of professionalism. Instead, Feaver draws 
attention to the type of relationship the civil – military actually is, namely the 
relationship between a principal and an agent. The military is an instrumental 
institution; a means to an end, and this makes the principal – agent theory the 
point of departure. Thus, the interest is directed at different patterns of civilian 
control. 
2.2 Towards contemporary operations 
In this section, I will discuss the impacts of the civil – military dilemma and the 
theories above in the context of operations. The aim is to identify a viable 
perspective on civil – military relations, shaping necessary conceptualisations of 
concepts in contemporary operations, relevant for this thesis. 
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A point of departure here is to understand the function of the military in 
relation to the civilian and the political. To be able to rightly define the function of 
the military, the primary activity of the military must be conceptualized and 
related to the contemporary context of Complex Irregular Warfare1 in which this 
thesis is set. I believe that the famous Clausewitzean dictum of war as a 
continuation of politics by other means is very useful. This is especially true of 
contemporary wars and crises since violent conflict is present as a consequence of 
the lack of political institutional capacity providing public goods. This stipulation 
asserts that the role of the military is to pursue political objectives with other 
means than policy. If the function of the military is a continuation of politics by 
other means, the functional imperative must be dependent on political objectives. 
Thus it seems that the integrated approach combined with principal-agent theory 
is what best conceptualizes the civil – military relationship, based on the 
Clausewitzean dictum about the nature of war. The theoretical underpinnings 
prescribes that the integrated approach to civil – military relations should provide 
better results, but this direct causal link is not entirely convincing (Egnell 
2007:47). Although integration may be necessary given the political nature of 
war, especially in CIW, its quality and impact cannot be guaranteed, as Egnell’s 
case studies of British and US operations in Iraq clearly demonstrates.  
There is a causal link between the character and structure of civil – military 
relations and operational conduct (Egnell 2007:239), but it is in no way direct or 
universal. Rather, it is conditional and probabilistic (Egnell 2007:79). There is a 
need to stipulate under which conditions the integrated approach is likely to 
succeed.  
There is some guidance to be found in existing research regarding these 
conditions. FOI2 has stipulated a number of mechanisms facilitating cooperation 
(Nilsson et al 2008b:56-65). The basic facilitating mechanism for cooperation is 
an integrated approach to analysis and planning, resulting in a common strategy 
and shared views of objectives and desired, viable outcomes. Facilitating 
mechanisms at a more operational level are mainly of the institutional character, 
such as integrated chains of command, co-location of offices, liaisons, 
communication systems. It is however important to emphasise that improvised 
and ad-hoc mechanisms are a crucial component beside the more institutionalised 
mechanisms, given the dynamic character of conflict environments.  
Ultimately, the functional imperative and evaluation of the utility of integrated 
civil – military relations lies in the ability to produce outcomes according to 
political objectives. This is evident given the military as an instrument of political 
will.  
This is where I position my thesis. Given that the causal chain between 
integration and outcomes in no way are direct and obvious, the impact and 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Complex Irregular Warfare is used as an umbrella concept for many types of operations similar 
in character, for example Peace Support Operations (which is the focus of this thesis), 
insurgencies, humanitarian interventions and low-intensity conflicts. See Egnell 2007:22 for 
further clarifications. Abbreviated CIW in this chapter. 
2 FOI, the Swedish Defence Research Agency 
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explanatory power of civil - military cooperation dynamics in relation to 
outcomes must be further investigated. Egnell (2007) takes an indirect approach to 
this problem, positioning the dependent variable of operational conduct against 
“best practice” identified in complex irregular warfare (Egnell 2007:29-41). 
However, a practice must partly be considered “best” due to its ability to produce 
viable outcomes.  
In my thesis, the focus is on the outcome aspect of effectiveness, examining 
the assumed causal link between mission command, coordinated operational 
conduct (implementation) and outcomes. The merit of my thesis positioned 
against Egnell is that I move the causal chain one step further (see figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 3: Causal chains in comparison 
2.2.1 Conceptualizing outcomes: ends defining the means 
Given the discussion above, a crucial question is what can be seen as a viable, 
positive outcome in the general category of CIW, which my case belongs to (see 
chapter 3). Some theoretically based conceptualizations can be made, guiding the 
analysis in later stages. 
 Based on the assertion that the utility of the military, and thus the 
functional imperative of the military in contemporary CIW, is the ability to attain 
political objectives by other means, the outcome can no longer be conceptualised 
as outright “victory” in military terms. Viable outcomes for action (especially 
military action) in CIW are essentially about establishing a condition from which 
political outcomes can be decided (Smith 2005:269). To conceptualize desired 
outcomes, the MPICE (Measuring Progress In Conflict Environments) framework 
provides an insightful operationalization of when peace becomes viable in a 
conflict environment (see figure 3), focusing on domestic political institutional 
capacity in relation to drivers of conflict. This matches well with the basic 
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conceptualization of viable outcomes as a condition in which political solutions 
are possible.  
 
   
Figure 4: The “X” Chart (Guttieri 2008:2 retrieved from http://www.sagecenter.net/node/20, 2009-02-16) 
 
The analytical approach in the MPICE framework is to trace reduction in the 
drivers of conflict and increases in domestic institutional capacity across five 
sectors (Guttieri 2008:2): 
 
1. Political moderation and stable democracy 
2. Safe and secure environment 
3. Rule of law 
4. Economic sustainability 
5. Social well-being 
 
This is a useful conceptualisation of viable outcomes to this thesis. It is also a 
good idea to divide the analysis in programmes relating to these sectors, as it 
makes the analysis more structured.  
2.2.2 Concluding remarks: the civil – military dilemma in 
contemporary operations 
As shown above, classic theory about how to solve the civil – military dilemma 
impacts on the way operations are understood and conceptualized, and also how 
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outcomes of these operations are conceptualized. The dilemma transferred to the 
operational setting is manifested in the paradox that the intervention takes over the 
functions of the failed domestic civilian institutions at the same time as the 
reconstruction of these institutions are imperative to success. Thus it is two 
opposed activities and objectives defining the functional imperative of the 
intervening force. The classic problem of striking a balance between military 
effectiveness and civilian control is put to its forefront in contemporary 
interventions.  
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3 Selection of case: The 
comprehensive intervention 
3.1 Delimitation: Conceptualizing the population of 
cases 
As stated above, this thesis will be conducted as a building block case study, with 
a theory-building and theory-testing aim. There are some important considerations 
to be made regarding the design of the study. A first relevant question when 
designing a case study is what constitutes a case?  
A point of departure is a general conceptualization of what constitutes a case 
in social science. George & Bennett define a case as “an instance of a class of 
events” (2005:17). This is the important question of “a case of what?” 
In this thesis, the general class of event studied is the intervention process in a 
conflict zone, seen as a special case of an inter-agency implementation process. 
The subclass is the comprehensive type of intervention. I will establish a 
conceptualization of this subclass of events below, which later guides the 
selection of case.  
3.1.1 The case outlined: Comprehensive intervention as a case of an 
intervention process 
The aspects of contemporary conflict place distinct demands on the type of 
intervention necessary to tackle these complex situations. The basic assertion is 
that security and development are inextricably linked. This requires a 
comprehensive, multi-actor intervention, with far-reaching goals such as 
democratization, reconstruction of institutional capacity and conflict 
transformation. A first important assertion is that the comprehensive intervention 
as I frame it in this thesis is mainly focused on the period of military intervention, 
normally dictated by a separate mandate from other programmes (Nilsson et al 
2008b:18). 
In the broadest term and from the military intervention perspective, a 
comprehensive intervention refers to “the approach to, and the implementation of, 
a peace support operation in coordination with other actors…” (Nilsson et al 
2008b:17). 
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Figure 5 below illustrates the “comprehensive intervention box”, outlining the 
temporal frame of the comprehensive intervention (the box), and thus the frame 
for the type of case studied. It also points to the level of security in the conflict 
environment during the intervention phase (the curve on the lower part), and the 
transition to existing and new self-sustaining programmes at the end of the box 
(the arrows running through the box along the timeline).  
 
 
Figure 5: The comprehensive intervention box (Nilsson et al 2008b:17) 
 
To summarize, we now have some basic traits guiding the selection of case: 
 
• There is a mandated military intervention that sets the time-frame for the 
case 
• Programmes dealing with humanitarian, political and development 
assistance run parallel to the intervention 
• Military intervention is regarded as complementary and facilitating 
• The end-state is a transition of responsibility to self-sustaining 
programmes with focus on long-term development (process-oriented 
gradual change of framework) 
3.1.2 The case outlined: comprehensive intervention as a case of an 
inter-agency implementation process 
A crucial aspect guiding the research design of this thesis is the conceptualization 
of the comprehensive intervention as a case of an inter-agency implementation 
process.  
  17 
The case will be structured according to a stage heuristic, where each stage 
represents an important activity in the implementation process. These stages are 
iteratively repeated as the intervention progresses and the operation environment 
change. The stages of the implementation process are: 
 
• Planning/decision 
• Implementation 
• Output 
• Outcome 
 
Output and outcome are kept separate for analytical reasons. Causality is traced 
across these stages in iterative steps, with strong emphasis on the interaction 
between structure and agency in shaping implementation and outcome. 
3.1.3 Drawing inferences from a single case: problems and 
opportunities 
An obvious problem with the research design described in chapter 1 and case 
studies in general is what kind of inferences that can be drawn. Equfinality can 
hamper the analysis. It is possible that other theories stressing the causal effect of 
different phenomena can reach the same outcome (George & Bennett 2005:161). 
This is remedied in this thesis in two ways. Firstly, multiple interactions take 
place, answering to changing conditions in the operation environment. This 
creates the opportunity to make multiple observations within the same case, and 
thus poses grounds for comparing and evaluating the causal effect of cooperation 
on outcomes (George & Bennett 2005:32, 220). The intervention as a case 
consists of several instances of interagency implementation, albeit linked in a 
continuous process of interaction between structure and agency.  
Secondly, the method of process tracing enables the researcher to investigate 
hypothesised casual connections in depth, and stipulate under which conditions 
the causal capacity of the hypothesised phenomenon is realized (George & 
Bennett 2005:207).  By making these assertions it is possible to test the hypothesis 
and explore the causal link between cooperative action and outcomes in a single 
case.  
3.2 Selection of case: most likely case, theory 
development and testing 
As theory are being developed and hypotheses and theory tested, at this initial 
stage of research into an under-theorized aspect, a most likely scenario is useful 
(George & Bennett 2005:121-122), where a large degree of structural integration 
is present. This enables me to investigate whether my analytical framework is 
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useful at all in producing interesting results, and by process tracing specifying and 
developing the initial hypothesis into a more refined and conditional statement 
(see section 1.5.2). Normally a most likely case is used to reject theories (George 
& Bennett 2005:121-122), but in this instance the goal is to specify theory and 
make an initial assessment of the usefulness of a new analytical approach. 
A most likely scenario holding the co-variation stipulated in the hypothesis (a 
large degree of cooperation and a positive outcome) is the UN mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL). It is a most likely scenario because: 
 
• The UN integrated missions concept that is applied in Liberia is deemed as 
the most mature comprehensive intervention approach, with its integrated 
chain of command. Thus there is presumably a high degree of cooperation 
(Hull 2008:10).  
• The outcome of the intervention is acknowledged as quite positive and 
successful (Hull 2008:11). 
 
Using UNMIL as a case fulfils the stipulated traits in section 3.1.1. The case is set 
in a post-conflict transitional setting, which opens up for a broad variety of actors 
and coordination opportunities of interest to this thesis.  
The case is set temporally between 2003 with the starting point in the wide 
deployment of UNMIL in October up to January 2006 when a new government 
was elected (SG progress report no.10 2006). Thus it covers the crucial transition 
period from the end of the conflict towards the first steps to self-sustaining peace. 
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4 Analytical framework 
Based on process tracing as a general method, and the conceptualisation of spiral 
causality presented in section 1.5.4, the analytical framework employed in this 
thesis is presented here. It is based on the basic conceptualisations about structure 
and agency as mutually constitutive and interacting to produce effects, where 
structure is seen as enabling and constraining in relation to agency, which then 
works in a feedback loop to change the preconditions for action. It follows the 
spiral pattern of causality identified above when the process is traced. The 
analytical model is presented below in figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6: analytical model 
4.1 General Outline 
This model is a combination of crisis decision-making theory and implementation 
theory, linking the two fields together in one framework. The model advances 
over time in analytical phases, where each phase is focused on change in the 
operation environment framework (OEF) via activities of planning/decision, 
implementation, output and outcome. Thus the model is read from top to bottom 
and left to right. 
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A new phase commences when a significant change has come about, that 
means a renegotiation of the preconditions for action. This means that the phases 
can cover varying temporal space, but are chronologically ordered, making 
process tracing over time possible. This adds analytical sensitivity, ensuring that 
crucial changes are not missed due to inappropriate temporal divisions. The 
framework is focused on outcomes as structural change, and tracks progress in a 
reflexive manner. Output and outcome are kept separate for analytical clarity 
although they may not be temporally separated, thus keeping the implementation 
process and its actor interaction in focus during the interaction process, and then 
analysing it in combination with operation environment factors. An important 
remark to be made is that causal processes can have varying temporal length, 
meaning that outcomes in phase 1 for example can still have effects on the OEF in 
phase 3, which the arrow from outcome phase 1via OEF phase 2 to OEF phase 3 
illustrates. In other words, previous actions can still have effects on the operation 
environment despite longer temporal separation, and constrain and enable action 
for following phases. Taking this into account in the analytical model enables me 
to study causality with short chains of events leading to long outcome chains of 
events, and also trace path dependence, i.e. if previous decisions and actions 
undertaken make certain causal developments more or less likely.  
Another crucial point is that the framework allows for analysis of the role of 
learning. Is there an adaptation in behaviour based on previous successes and 
failures? 
Below, each analytical category is discussed, where content such as relevant 
activities and properties within the categories are highlighted.  
4.2 Operation Environment Framework 
This analytical category can be seen as the alpha and omega of the model 
employed. It is the starting point for analysis in each phase where structural 
features that constrains and enables action are identified and thus sets the playing 
field for interaction. It is also the end of the line in the analysis, as the final goal 
outcome is identified as a condition from which political outcomes can be 
decided. The effect of action, and more specifically, cooperative action, is 
measured by the structural change of the operation environment it is able to 
facilitate (outcomes feeding back to, and changing the OEF).  
Thus this category contains the circumstances external to the following 
interaction process that dictates the preconditions for action. This modelling is 
inspired by the “institutional rational choice” framework for analysing policy 
processes (Ostrom i Sabatier 2007:27), where external factors are treated as 
preconditions that sets the stage for agency. The reflexive dimension is also 
important, which is concerned with how agency changes the preconditions for 
action by producing outputs leading to certain outcomes.  
In basic structure and agency terms, the OEF is concerned with the structure 
(preconditions) that defines the world of the possible for agency, the latent carrier 
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of causality (Wight 2006:298), and how the OEF is changed in a reflexive manner 
by agency.  
Thus this category can contain different forms of entities and phenomena, 
such as institutionalised structures dictating how information is exchanged or 
hostile local environment constraining relief efforts.  
The analytical task in this category is firstly to identify the preconditions 
constraining and enabling agency, and how these preconditions sets the stage for 
action. As the analysis progresses, the task are to identify change of these 
preconditions creating new enablers and constraints for agency.  
4.3 The interaction process 
This cluster of analytical categories is concerned with the unfolding events, i.e. 
the agency, which unfolds based on the structural conditions in the OEF. Focus 
through these categories are on the actions undertaken by actors in the 
intervention process, progressing from planning/decision activities to the 
production of output by implementation. Through the analysis of the different 
stages in the interaction process, attention will especially be directed to the 
activation of cooperation mechanisms and the unfolding implementation and 
production of output of cooperative action. In the ideal comprehensive 
intervention, coherence is upheld through the whole of the process and therefore 
attention is directed towards tracing cooperative action across the analytical 
categories. 
Below, each analytical category of activity is described, with focus on what 
kind of activities will be analysed, and how.  
4.3.1 Planning/decision 
This category is focused on the activities of planning and subsequent decision-
making based on the preconditions identified in the OEF. This is basically about 
how responses to the situation are formalised and conceptualised at the strategic to 
the operational level, the “ends, ways and means of the intervention” (Nilsson et 
al 2008b:54). This is an important step to include, since it will guide and define 
the actions undertaken in the following steps. It is also an important analytical 
category to analyse iteratively, hence present in every phase, since this enables me 
to trace how responses are formulated to a changing context (Nilsson et al 
2008b:51, 55).  
The analytical task in this category is in the first phases to identify how the 
intervention is formalised, based on the preconditions of the intervention, such as 
the conflict environment and the overall mandate. In the following phases, the 
focus will be on how responses are formulated through planning and decision-
making in relation to a dynamic and changing environment.  
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Since my research interest is directed towards the role of cooperation in the 
production of outcomes, special attention will be given to the degree of coherence 
in the (re)planning and decision-making. It creates the setting for understanding 
the subsequent implementation undertaken, and the cooperation dynamics in the 
implementation, thus enabling me to trace cooperation across the analytical 
categories.  
This will be the important backdrop for understanding and analysis in the 
category of implementation. Based on the decisions, what unfolds when they are 
converted to action? 
4.3.2 Implementation 
Implementation can in its simplest form be described as ”the stage in the policy 
process concerned with turning policy intentions into action” (John quoted in Hill 
& Hupe 2002:7-8). This stage in the process is often neglected in the literature of 
crisis management, where decisions are directly linked to outcomes. But as 
Allison states, “most decisions leave considerable leeway in implementation” 
(Allison & Zelikov 1999:304). This means that in order to trace the process and 
identify and specify the role of cooperation in the production of outcome, the 
implementation process cannot be left out. 
The analytical task in this category is to analyse the implementation process 
against the backdrop of the OEF, and the planning and decisions made. The OEF 
and the plans established in the previous category will be treated as 
enablers/constraints in the process of implementation. Focus will be directed to 
cooperative implementation, and if this is of a flexible improvised nature or based 
on cooperative planning and decisions. By linking the OEF, planning and decision 
to implementation, the process can be traced across analytical categories to 
outcome, and it is possible to identify if the outcome was a result of planned or 
improvised, modified implementation.  
4.3.3 Output 
This analytical category is evaluation oriented and basically concerned with the 
performance of the implementation process, what the output is of plans and 
decisions converted into action. Performance is evaluated based on the 
convergence between plans and decisions and the implementation process. There 
is also an important distinction made between output and outcome for analytical 
clarity. Output is the performance of the process, whereas outcome is concerned 
with the impact of the process in the operation environment (Hill & Hupe 
2002:63). This enables me to summarize what actually was done in relation to 
decisions and planning before analysing impact.  
The analytical task is therefore to summarize and evaluate the interaction 
process by analysing the interplay and compatibility between planning/decision-
making and implementation. 
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4.4 Outcomes 
This is the final analytical stage in one phase, and in this stage the impact of the 
interaction process on the operation environment is evaluated. The outcome is 
thus a combination of the output above interacting with the dynamic factors of the 
operation environment, producing effect. This basically means that independent 
factors external to the policy and implementation process influence the result of 
the process (Hill & Hupe 2002:122). The analytical design enables me to analyse 
unpredictability in the production of effect.   
This stage is the important link to the next phase, conceptualising outcome as 
a change of the operation environment, which sets the stage for action in the next 
phase or even several following phases.  
Thus the analytical task in this category is firstly to link the performance of 
the interaction process to the impact in the conflict environment by adding the 
dynamic factors external to the interaction process influencing the outcome. This 
identified impact will then alter the preconditions in the OEF for the following 
phases. The second task is to evaluate the outcome in terms of positive and 
negative effects. For this task I employ the MPICE definition of viable peace as 
standards for evaluating outcomes (see figure 4 in section 2.2.1). The outcome is 
deemed positive if it contributes to either the reduction of conflict drivers or the 
increase of domestic institutional capacity, or both. This is important to evaluate 
and track to be able to specify the role of cooperation in the production of positive 
outcomes. To add analytical clarity, outcomes are evaluated and categorised in 5 
areas of intervention activity identified as major mission elements of conflict 
transformation and stabilization in the quest for viable peace (Guttieri 2008:2). 
Conflict transformation and stabilization as outcomes are tracked in these sectors 
across three stages, stage 0 – imposed stability, stage 1 – assisted stability, stage 2 
– self-sustaining peace (MPICE Metrics Framework 2008:5). In this thesis the 
process is traced from stage 0 to stage 1. The sectors of major mission elements 
are presented in figure 7 below: 
 
Political Moderation & Stable Democracy 
Security 
Rule of Law 
Economic Sustainability 
Social Well-being 
 
          STAGE 0     STAGE I                    STAGE II 
Figure 7: Major mission elements of conflict transformation and stabilization (MPICE 2008:5) 
 
The MPICE framework uses goals in each sector under the headlines “diminish 
drivers of conflict” and “strengthen institutional performance”, and each goal 
contains a number of indicators to determine if the effect is a reduction of conflict 
drivers or an increase in domestic institutional capacity.  
However, the indicators will be thematically used to evaluate if it is classified 
as a positive or negative outcome according to the criteria stated above. The 
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reason for me to not to adhere to the indicators in a strict sense is that such 
inquiries lies beyond the scope of this thesis, since the purpose of the MPICE 
framework is to track progress in detail. For me to be able to link cooperation to 
positive outcomes, it is enough to assert if the outcome in each phase can be 
deemed positive at all, according to the basic definition of viable peace above. A 
thematically relevant application of indicators is enough. This stage concludes one 
phase. 
In the next chapter, phase one is analysed according to the model presented 
here. 
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5 Analysis 
In this chapter, the analysis is performed according to the model presented in the 
previous chapter. The analysis starts off with an investigation of the start-up phase 
of UNMIL, up to the point where the intervention is fully mobilised and 
operational in Liberia. This also includes the start-up of the important 
disarmament and demobilisation process.  
5.1 Phase 1: UNMIL deployment, August 2003 – 
March 2004 
5.1.1 Operation Environment Framework phase 1 
The framework enabling and constraining the whole UNMIL intervention and 
especially the deployment and start-up of the mission is presented in this section. 
It consists of two parts, one consisting of the general situation in the operation 
environment, where drivers of conflict are identified and presented along with a 
description of the many mounting problems in Liberia. The second part is 
concerned with the institutional UN framework and especially the mandate for 
UNMIL. The command structure set up for the operation is also described.  
 
The operation environment: Post-conflict, Pre-peace 
 
Liberia was at the time of the planning and deployment of UNMIL a post-conflict 
setting, with a peace treaty in place signed in Accra, Ghana in August 2003. This 
put an end to 14 years of civil war that claimed the lives of over 200 000 
Liberians and displaced at least a million others within and outside of the country 
(Fiawosime in Fiawosime and Bah 2005:165). There is no single cause that can 
explain the conflict; rather, it is a combination of causes that can explain the civil 
war that lasted for over a decade. Political exclusion and inequality is an 
important factor (Aboagye & Bah 2004:16) that has been present in Liberia for a 
long time (Frerks et al 2006:72).  
This is the setting in which the UNMIL operation enters, and the scope of the 
analysis. Although hostilities are largely concluded and a feasible peace treaty is 
signed, there are mounting problems that need to be addressed in order to avoid a 
relapse into conflict. A chief conflict driver identified above is the politics of 
exclusion and repression based on ethnic identities and affiliation with ruling 
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elites (Frerks et al 2006:73). This is coupled with weak justice systems, causing 
corruption and impunity. The security sector needs to be reformed extensively, 
since it were often used for human right violations and repression. The whole 
region is also unstable, which is acerbated by the numerous ex-combatants present 
in the region along with easy access to small arms. There is large human 
suffering, food shortage and poverty both as a cause and result of conflict. The 
large number of IDP’s and refugees returning worsens this, causing strains on a 
virtually non-existent infrastructure, where the health, transport and education 
systems are collapsed (McCandless 2008:5). These factors underline the tense 
peace present in Liberia at the time of the start-up of UNMIL. But enabling 
factors in dealing with these problems are also present, facilitating the 
establishment and actions of UNMIL. These are listed below: 
 
1. There is a feasible peace agreement to enforce. There is a stable albeit 
tense situation with a war-weary, benign population awaiting the 
deployment of UNMIL. This means that UNMIL will not have to get 
involved in outright combat to enforce their presence, and security 
concerns for own personnel are less constraining. 
2. There is already a peacekeeping presence on the ground. The presence of 
ECOMIL facilitates the establishment of UNMIL as forces with situational 
awareness and headquarters already are present (Aboagye & Bah 
2005:100-102). This is an important enabling factor. 
 
Next, the UNMIL mandate and the UN structure for UNMIL is examined and 
analysed as precondition factors. 
 
The resolution and the UN framework: enabling UNMIL as an integrated 
mission 
 
In September 2003, Security Council resolution 1509 was adopted, which set up 
the basic task and mandate for UNMIL. This is therefore the overarching 
framework for the mission.  
Resolution 1509 sets up the mandate and frame for UNMIL. The mandate 
states that transfer of authority is due on 1 October 2003, and the mandate 
stretches for 12 months, and was subsequently prolonged. UNMIL was essentially 
mandated with two overarching task, to support and to protect. These tasks 
included the following responsibilities (UNSC resolution 1509:3-4): 
 
• Support for the implementation of the cease-fire agreement 
• Support for humanitarian and human rights assistance 
• Support for security sector reform 
 
• Protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment,  
• Ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, 
without prejudice to the efforts of the government,  
• Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its 
capabilities; 
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Resolution 1509 is a broad mandate with a robust chapter VII base. This serves as 
an enabling institutional factor for UNMIL, granting them the necessary 
legitimacy and mission objectives for carrying out their mission. This frames the 
mission as a comprehensive intervention, as it is tasked with supporting the 
transition from war to peace, rather than merely keeping the peace (Frerks et al 
2006:76). This broad mandate is also reflected in the institutional structure of 
UNMIL, which is discussed below. 
 
The structure of UNMIL and the UN framework: enabling the 
comprehensive intervention 
 
An important enabling factor for the mission is firstly the UN framework as the 
institutional context for the mission. The UN system is the only international 
organisation that can undertake comprehensive missions all by itself (Nilsson et al 
2008b:46). The UN consists of a large range of capacities, which enables them to 
undertake and manage complex peace building missions. Furthermore, the UN is 
the only international institution that has legitimacy to intervene or mandate 
others to intervene in states (Nilsson et al 2008b:46-47). These factors are great 
enablers when setting up and executing interventions. 
The largest constrainer is that the UN is dependent on member states for 
funding, approval and troop contributions, which can render responses slow or 
inadequate (Nilsson et al 2008b:46-47).  
With the enabling and broad UN system mobilised for UNMIL, the structure 
of the mission represents these strengths of the UN and is what marks UNMIL as 
an integrated mission. The structure of UNMIL is presented in figure 8 below.  
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Figure 8: The structure of UNMIL (Hull 2008:23) 
 
All components of the mission is under the leadership of the special representative 
of the secretary general (SRSG), which means that the mission has an integrated 
chain of command with one commander of the entire mission. 
As is evident above, the challenges in Liberia are pressing and large, where a 
fragile peace exists in a war-torn country. But there is also a structural enabler in 
the UN system, equipping UNMIL with necessary tools to meet these challenges. 
The following analysis over the phases to come is the story of how these structural 
preconditions are transformed into action and results.  
5.1.2 Planning/Decision phase 1 
In this section, the planning and decision-making concerning the start-up of 
UNMIL are analysed. This planning was under a tight constraint of time-pressure, 
as the take-over from ECOMIL was set to October 1, 2003.  
 
The planning of the deployment of UNMIL 
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At the overall strategic level, the planning of UNMIL was designed in accordance 
with recommendations made by the Brahimi report, which outlines the UN 
integrated mission peacekeeping concept (Durch et al 2003:47). This entailed the 
set-up of an integrated mission task force (IMTF) that would enable broad inputs 
from the competencies of the UN system. The IMTF consist of several UN 
departments that jointly plan the aspects of the mission. However, there were too 
many representatives involved, which meant that the IMTF quickly became a 
briefing format instead of a truly integrated planning body (Durch et al 2003:48). 
Traditional ways of planning and decision-making where heavily relied upon, 
with the department of peacekeeping operation (DPKO) taking the lead in 
planning, as this is the standard channel of planning and decision-making under 
the authority of the secretary general (Hull 2008:25).   
The IMTF was replaced by a Liberia working group to reduce the number of 
participants, and this group proved more effective at working out differences 
between police and military functions (Durch et al 2003:48). However, it was still 
mostly an aide to the DPKO, and the group failed at drafting a joint integrated 
strategy for Liberia (Hull 2008:26). The strategic planning lacked integration, and 
DPKO took their perspectives on what was needed for other UN agencies. Also, 
communication horizontally and vertically (to the UN country team, UNCT, in 
Liberia) was flawed (Eide et al 2005:22-23). This resulted in a heavy reliance on 
DPKO and that other departments of the UN had to conform to their “security 
first” agenda (Campell & Kaspersen 2008:474). UNMIL initiated the operation 
from the planning without an integrated strategic framework, which meant that 
common views of objectives and vision for the mission was lacking. 
Previous experiences and SOP’s where heavily relied upon in the planning 
process, hampering integration and resulting in a lack of a shared strategic 
framework. 
The assessment missions carried out before the deployment, compensated for 
a lack of ground awareness and enabled swift deployment, alleviated these flaws 
to some extent. The assessment missions were much more integrated in their 
design and execution. Liaison officers were used in contact with the ECOMIL 
presence on the ground, and several UN departments along with troop 
contributing countries participated in the assessment missions. Contacts were also 
established with the rebel factions to guarantee access (Fiawosime in Fiawosime 
and Bah 2005:173-174). This also resulted in the establishment of an advance UN 
headquarters that the UN ran in collaboration with regional staff until the larger 
UNMIL force was deployed (Aboagye & Bah in Fiawosime and Bah 2005:101-
102). The logistics branch was also deployed. 
As a result of the inputs from the liason officers and the establishment of 
logistics and advance headquarters, this enabled the UNMIL to deploy rapidly.  
 
Needs assessment: an evolving transitional strategic framework 
 
As the deployment of UNMIL was underway, the lack of a strategic framework 
became evident. To remedy this, the UN set up a Joint Needs Assessment in 
collaboration with the World Bank, to set up a strategic framework for the 
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transition to durable peace (UNDG Liberia 2006:3). This planning was an 
integrated effort with technical assessment groups and a coordinating body in 
Liberia. Many stakeholders were involved, including the Liberian transition 
government (NTGL). This planning process resulted in a results focused transition 
framework (RFTF), which outlined priorities in clusters with attached costs 
(UNDG Liberia 2006:3-4). An attempt were also made to incorporate the 
Humanitarian appeals framework driven by the Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Activities (OCHA), but was eventually kept as needs outside of the 
RFTF.  
Although the effort was integrated and included a commendable width in 
stakeholders, UNMIL, due to engagement with deployment, did not participate to 
a larger extent. There was no linkage to the assessment missions, which would 
have been useful since access outside the capital Monrovia was heavily 
constrained. There was also no link to other strategic plans such as the UN 
development assistance framework or the long-term strategy of the NTGL 
(UNDG Liberia 2006:5). This made some of the objectives in the clusters overly 
optimistic. As a strategic framework it was a good attempt, but lacked 
considerations of root causes of conflict and the weak ability of the state 
institutions as implementers. As a strategic framework must consider root causes 
and have a centre of gravity on which the resolution of the conflict relies to make 
all other efforts possible (Eide et al 2005:19), the RFTF did not manage to provide 
the strategic overview for the transition period. 
But the assessment was an important coordinated appeal for funds based on 
needs identified on the ground.  
 
Rehabilitating the ex-combatants 
 
A Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) 
programme was identified as a key ingredient in the transition to peace. The 
planning was hallmarked by a broad engagement of UN, NGO, donors and local 
actors, and resulted in an action plan. The structure set up by this plan was under 
the leadership of a national commission for DDRR (NCDDRR), which gave 
policy to the Joint Implementation Unit (JIU). The JIU was the hub of the DDRR 
programme structure, supported by a technical committee (UNDP 2004:12). The 
plan covered the DDRR process, but was biased towards the DD part without 
much attention given to rehabilitation and reintegration. This was to be able to 
jump-start the programme in December 2003 (UNDP 2004:46-47). Although the 
plan lacked sufficient coverage of the RR component, the structure outlined was 
integrated and contained many implementing agencies, covering areas as 
administration, medical care, security and demobilisation, enabling the 
programme to handle the DDRR in a comprehensive way. The DDRR programme 
is thus an example a heavily integrated field. 
In the next section, the implementation of the deployment and startup of the 
DDRR programme is analysed, along with the results of the needs assessment. 
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5.1.3 Implementation phase 1 
In this section, the initial implementation of the planning processes above are 
described and analysed. The deployment of UNMIL is the most notable activity. 
 
The deployment of UNMIL 
 
The troops deployed in four sectors of the country, starting mainly in sector one, 
the capital Monrovia and its surroundings. The deployment of troops was in broad 
terms implemented quite rapidly. In mid-march 2004, 85% of the force had been 
deployed (DPKO best practices unit 2004:6).  This was much owed to the 
assessment missions made before deployment, enabling to assess ground 
situations. Although this can be viewed as a success in comparison with other UN 
deployments, UNMIL did not deploy in the 90-day timeframe endorsed by the 
mandate and the Brahimi report.  
This was mainly because of a slow response from the troop contributing 
countries to fulfil the pledges that was made. This was also in part due to 
logistical constraints due to a shortfall in support personnel and the re-hatting of 
the ECOMIL troops. Also, camps and facilities were in a poor condition (DPKO 
best practices unit 2004). Another problematic factor was that the established 
headquarters could not be co-located due to the infrastructure constraints 
discussed in the OEF above. The separate location of civil and military 
components created an idea of separate chains of command inconsistent with 
UNMIL structure (DPKO best practices unit 2004:8).  The shortfall of civilian 
personnel was a key concern, constraining the overall deployment, especially 
regarding logistics, but also impacted on crucial activities as the DDRR 
programme (see below). The public information component was rapidly deployed, 
but was constrained by limited logistical and technical expertise discussed above. 
This meant that the launch of radio broadcasts was delayed (UNDPKO best 
practices unit 2004:14). 
 
The disarmament and demobilisation start-up: Camp Scheiffelin, Dec 2003 
 
The DDRR programme was quickly launched on 7 Dec 2003, with demobilisation 
activities outside Monrovia. However, the implementation was ill-prepared and 
executed due to lack of experienced personnel, both civilian and military, the 
weak infrastructure of the camp and insufficient logistical support that could 
correct it. Another aspect contributing to the failed implementation was that the 
number of ex-combatants estimated to register was largely underestimated, and no 
information campaign was held before the start-up due to logistical problems, 
making expectations on the demobilisation process unrealistic (Jennings 
2007:208). The situation got out of hand when a massive turnout of ex-
combatants started violence, looting and riots at the camp and in Monrovia, due to 
the inability of the programme to attend to all the ex-combatants. The situation 
was eventually resolved through a timely and coordinated effort by the WFP and 
UNMIL liaison officers enabling distribution of food packages and other items to 
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calm the situation (Fiawosime in Fiawosime and Bah 2005:175). The start-up of 
the programme was then resumed and a total of 13,490 combatants were disarmed 
(Aboagye & Bah in Fiawosime and Bah 2005:110).  
 
From assessment to funding: Donor conference 
 
An important activity implemented in line with needs assessment planning 
process was the international donor conference held at the UN HQ in New York, 
February 2004. The RFTF outlined was overwhelmingly endorsed, resulting in $ 
520 million pledged for the reconstruction of Liberia (UNDG Liberia 2006:7). 
5.1.4 Output phase 1 
The output of the implementation can be evaluated and commented from two 
perspectives. The deployment can firstly be viewed as largely successful and rapid 
in comparison to other UN operations, the output being that UNMIL had managed 
to deploy 85% of the force in mid-March 2003. This successful deployment owes 
much to the assessment missions undertaken beforehand.  
However, in relation to made planning, the deployment did not manage the 
90-day time-frame. The lack of competent civilian personnel and the slow 
reaction of the troop contributing countries were especially problematic. This in 
turn affected other projects such as the DDRR process, and the consolidation of 
security outside of Monrovia.  
We can here see how the start-up phase of the deployment is linked in a chain 
of events, with roots in the structural features of the UN system, its strengths and 
weaknesses. What enabled the deployment and made it possible was the 
experience present in the UN system with peacekeeping. On the other hand, the 
weakness of the UN framework is also acerbated. That is, the reliance on 
voluntary contributions from member states to amass personnel and other assets. 
We can see how the short time-frame set up during planning led to unrealistic 
expectations on the implementation, and how the structural features of the UN 
framework manifested themselves to affect the implementation, thus limiting the 
output of the deployment, and in turn, hampering several other projects, most 
notably the DDRR. The DDRR process was initiated with weak performance due 
to the implementation shortfalls in the deployment, leading to inadequate security, 
facility support, administration and communication with relevant stakeholders. 
The constraining infrastructural conditions on the ground further complicated the 
implementation.  
Overall, the output (implementation in relation to planning) shortfalls can be 
ascribed to the unrealistic time-frame of 90 days in combination with the built in 
constraints in the UN framework discussed earlier.  
The output of the needs assessment was positive however, since it managed to 
secure fund pledges for the mission at the donor conference.  
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5.1.5 Outcome phase 1 
The outcome of the deployment in large is that the security situation in Monrovia 
was largely improved, making it possible for the UN to consolidate their position 
there for inland advancement. This is the major change of the OEF that calls for 
the analysis to commence with phase 2. However, the deployment delays 
discussed earlier made the inland consolidation and setting up of headquarters in 
other sectors delayed, in effect resulting little or no improvements of the security 
situation outside Monrovia (SG progress report no. 1 2003:2).  
The outcome of the start-up of the DDRR process can be seen as having a 
short and long impact. The short outcome was that the security situation 
deteriorated, leading to riots and looting at the camp and around Monrovia. Here 
we clearly see a case of external events to the interaction process interacting with 
weak output to produce a volatile short-term outcome. However, as a result of the 
rioting and looting, the DDRR programme was suspended until the preparations 
were adequate. This is an aggravating outcome; since this hampered the DDRR in 
other parts of the country, leaving ex-combatants active around the country, thus 
further destabilizing the security outside Monrovia (SG progress report no 1 
2003:14). However, even though the suspension lead to a preservation of a 
conflict driver for some time, it gave important lessons learned for the resumption 
of the programme and an expedited access to funding (Aboagye & Bah in 
Fiawosime & Bah 2005:110). The outcome on the short term meant a preservation 
of a crucial conflict driver and deteriorated security for a short period in 
Monrovia, but the long term outcome stretching in to the next phases is lessons 
learned and funding for the resumption of the programme. 
The needs assessment gave an important outcome in form of funding due to 
the results of the donor conference discussed above.  
To evaluate the outcome of phase one, we first need to categorise outcomes 
based on MPICE sectors of crucial activities, then look if conflict drivers are 
reduced or institutional capacity boosted. The most notable impact is made in the 
sector concerning security, with the deployment of UNMIL. The conflict 
transformation is clearly in stage 0, since active intervention is necessary to 
maintain order (MPICE 2008:5). Overall, the impact of the deployment and 
DDRR activities is a reduction of conflict drivers concerning security, since the 
political violence in Monrovia is diminished and the threat from ex-combatants is 
diminished after the demobilisation (MPICE 2008:16). However, at this stage, 
these impacts are only relevant for the Monrovia area, and represent a positive 
outcome spatially limited. 
There is an identified positive outcome concerning the security sector. What 
instances of cooperation can be identified as contributing to this positive 
outcome? 
The most notable cooperative action contributing to this outcome is the 
assessment missions undertaken, that paved the way for UNMIL deployment. 
Liaison officers were an important mechanism used. Also, the concerted action of 
the Liaison officers and WFP enabled the DDRR start-up to proceed with 
demobilisation. The needs assessment was a broad instance of cooperative 
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planning that resulted in crucial funding for the mission. From this initial phase, it 
can be concluded that cooperative action served a supportive role enabling action 
and thus facilitating the output, but was not the main vehicle driving the 
implementation to outcome, as the UNMIL deployment planning and execution 
was handled mainly by the DPKO. Although the DDRR planning was integrated, 
the constraints created by the weaknesses of the deployment combined with the 
infrastructural constraints of the ground failed to produce expected impact. It 
seems that coordination mainly had a facilitating impact on the operational level, 
in concrete mission settings on the ground with a clear, achievable outcome.  
5.2 Phase 2: Commencement of programmes, March 
– December 2004 
5.2.1 Operation Environment Framework phase 2 
A key question is what changes have come about that warrants the shift to a new 
analytical phase, and how these operate as constrainers/enablers for action. It is 
clear that the deployment of UNMIL marks a dramatic change to the operation 
environment, since it is a large operation deploying a number of actors in Liberia. 
The most notable change is the increase in security, stabilising the Monrovia area 
and expanding beyond as the deployment continues. This increase in security 
means that the preconditions for action change, as new areas become accessible 
and a large number of humanitarian and political activities can commence (SG 
report no. 3 2004:11, SG report no. 4 2004:16). As phase 2 begins, the 
deployment of UNMIL is largely completed.  
As the planning and implementation aspects of deployment have been 
discussed in phase 1, the deployment will from now on be treated as an enabling 
structural factor. The deployment continues on a smaller scale, and thus doesn’t 
warrant analytical planning and implementation attention. This security enabler 
opens up the playing field for a range of activities. 
I will trace the activities of DDRR, rule of law, humanitarian assistance and 
the organising of elections through the stages with a sectored approach. These are 
crucial components of the mission in line with the peace accord, and touches upon 
the focus sectors of the MPICE framework.  
As the security situation is stabilised, but fragile, due to the UNMIL presence 
(SG progress report no.3 2004:4), The focus becomes the increased activity in 
political, humanitarian and development programmes. These programmes face 
formidable challenges and are constrained mainly by the lack of infrastructure, 
such as facilities and passable roads, food and competent civilian personnel (SG 
progress report no.3 2004:8). Also, the composition of the transitional government 
(shared by the armed factions) and the low institutional capacity to restore 
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government control coupled with widespread corruption is constraining the efforts 
to re-establish the rule of law (Bashua in Fiawosime & Bah 2005:134).  
After some difficulties in the initial deployment, a working public information 
system is in place, which provides an enabling mechanism to deliver information 
to the public and facilitate smooth implementation of programmes, most notably 
the DDRR process (SG progress report no.3 2004:8). 
In sum, the operation environment is somewhat stabilised, which enable these 
programmes to start on a larger scale, but the lack of infrastructure, the deplorable 
humanitarian situation and the lack of personnel constrains the programmes. 
5.2.2 Planning/Decision phase 2 
In this planning phase, the preparations and outlined plans and mechanisms for 
implementing the programmes in focus is examined.  
 
Strategic Planning: Implementation goals 
 
At the strategic level, the RFTF stands as the closest thing to a strategic 
framework for the operation. This continues to be the main framework for 
prioritizing needs and negotiating these between the national actors (UNDG 
Liberia 2006:12). But as mentioned, there is a significant lack in coordination, 
since the clusters of activity are poorly linked due to uncoordinated reports, and 
mechanisms for monitoring and coordination did not work properly, resulting in 
inadequate tracking of donor funds received and difficulties on assessing impacts 
(UNDG Liberia 2006:12). Although it serves the purpose of channelling funds 
and linking projects to donors, the RFTF as an overall plan lacks in coordination 
and transparency, and serves more as implementation guidance than a strategic 
framework that sequences and coordinates activity to a shared ultimate goal. This 
weak strategic coordination constrains the impacts of individual programmes 
under review.  
In April 2004, UNMIL released an Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan 
(IMIP). This was however more of a plan outlining important activities than a 
strategic framework (Hull 2008:26).   
 
Disarmament, Rehabilitation: Lessons learned, plans remade  
 
Due to the events described in phase 1, the programme was suspended. However, 
this provided crucial lessons for the resumption of the programme in April 2004. 
In a sense, past failures were utilised in the planning of the re-launch, thus 
enabling a secure and efficient disarmament and demobilisation. The national 
commission on DDRR (NCDDRR) guided the process through policy direction, 
and the set up mechanisms for funding and implementation were utilized to 
identify and reconstruct cantonment sites for disarmament and demobilisation and 
contract implementing partners. The planning process this time around is marked 
by an integrated effort, drawing on relevant components of the UN system and 
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NGO implementing partners to address the needs in the DDRR process in a 
comprehensive manner. Planning and allocation of resources were fair and 
transparent (UNDP 2004:12-16). The plan set up is designed for the 
demobilisation of 38,000 ex-combatants. 
A crucial component in the planning process is the intense information and 
sensitisation campaign held across the country by UNMIL department of public 
information and the JIU (UNDP 2004:9). This was enabled by the working public 
information system set up as a result of the deployment phase. This was a crucial 
initiative, which minimized risks of misunderstandings on benefits and purposes.  
The planning and preparations for the re-launch of the programme was this 
time around carefully planned and executed. Camps were carefully selected and 
prepared, and relevant stakeholders were involved in the planning process, which 
made sure that acceptable security, sanitation, transport and infrastructure and 
administrative conditions were resolved, and standards were in place for these 
issues (UNDP 2004:15). 
The planning of the subsequent rehabilitation and reintegration component 
was not given the attention as the first component did (UNDP 2004). The plans 
envisaged in December stands, which means that eligible ex-combatants will 
receive social and economic training and counselling, participating in various 
projects, mainly implemented by community based NGOs contracted by the JIU 
(UNDP 2004:36, 40-41). There were also stopgap projects planned to fill the 
transfer period between demobilisation and rehabilitation projects (UNDP 
2004:46-47).  
To summarise, the planning process was this time carefully executed, with a 
broad base of stakeholders involved and functioning coordination mechanisms. 
The lessons learned from the December demobilisation was incorporated into the 
planning of the activities. This shows that the analytical structure of phases and 
iterative processes can identify instances of learning. The eagerness to restart the 
programme made the planning biased towards the DD components, leaving the 
RR components neglected in terms of economic and implementation plans.  
 
Humanitarian aid: Coordination mechanisms  
 
With the security umbrella of UNMIL largely established, and the DDRR process 
on track, the various humanitarian aid programmes boosts their activities due to 
the enabling security situation. Since there is a multitude of actors working in this 
field, and many of them operates outside the UNMIL structure, there is no 
coherent planning for this field. However, there are several coordination 
mechanisms and also planning activities linked to these that are interesting to 
discuss. Beyond this, the focus will be on the rehabilitation of refugees and IDPs 
and provision of health care in this sector of work.  
Within the UN structure, the office for coordination of humanitarian affairs 
(OCHA) is responsible for the coordination and strategic guidance of 
humanitarian programmes. This is an agency outside of the UNMIL structure. But 
in the phase under review, the decision was made to incorporate OCHA into the 
UNMIL structure, and the Humanitarian Coordination Section was established 
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(Frerks et al 2006:80). The HCS works as an interface structure between UNMIL, 
other UN agencies and NGOs. Planning and coordination is also channelled 
through the Humanitarian Action Committee, which hold regular briefings with 
NGOs and other UN agencies, to ensure that aid efforts are coordinated (Frerks et 
al 2006:80). There has been some critique of the disbandment of OCHA and 
integration of the HCS into the UNMIL structure from NGOs. They mean that 
their impartiality and neutrality is compromised due to the affiliations of HCS to 
the military and political UN agencies (Olson & Gregorian 2007:41). This poses a 
constraint to the planning of humanitarian efforts. But the picture is not uniform, 
given the plethora of aid agencies operating in Liberia. Most NGOs of the 
principled position are international, big entities, and the cooperative NGOs 
mostly consist of local organisations. Also, the perspectives in the rural and 
remote areas seem to be more pragmatic than in Monrovia (Frerks et al 2006:92). 
However, at a minimum, the HCS enabled actors to get up to date information and 
possibilities of field coordination, especially logistics. 
However, there is a clear lack of shared strategic perspectives and 
comprehensive planning (Olson & Gregorian 2007:51-53). 
 
Rule of Law: restoring state capacity 
 
As the security umbrella of UNMIL is established in Liberia, a priority is to 
strengthen state capacity by establishing the rule of law. To this end, there is a 
dire need to restructure the police service. This task is coupled with the strong 
challenge of reforming the judiciary and penal systems. This task is heavily 
constrained by the lack of skilled personnel and infrastructure. There are few 
working courts and prisons in Liberia. One target that is set is that the Liberian 
police service should include 1800 officers for the elections scheduled for October 
2005 (SG progress report no. 3 2004:7).  
To coordinate the effort and gain a comprehensive and holistic approach to 
planning and implementation of the rule of law sector, the Rule of Law 
Implementation Committee (ROLIC) is established. This mechanism is chaired by 
the deputy special representative for rule of law, and involves several stakeholders 
from the transition government and UNMIL (SG progress report no.3 2004:7). As 
a strategic planning mechanism, the ROLIC is clearly constrained by the 
transition government’s inability and, sometimes, unwillingness to initiate major 
reform of the judiciary system and laws. ROLIC advice was ignored in 98% of the 
cases (Blume 2008:8-9). Planning is mostly short-term; the overall picture 
becomes shattered, with uneven standards across the country. Partial interests are 
manifested in the political system and impacts on the rule of law reform, making 
progress at the strategic level constrained.  
At the operational level, the planning and set up of the reforms show better 
results. The UNMIL civilian police (CIVPOL) component together with civil 
society stakeholders developed a comprehensive training package for the new 
Liberian police, coupled with extensive screening mechanisms for identifying 
eligible recruits (Aboagye & Bah 2004:11). This was coupled with the restoration 
of the police academy funded by a UNMIL quick impact project (SG progress 
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report no.3 2004:7), which is an integral mechanism of the integrated mission 
concept. CIVPOL also concluded an agreement with the transition government 
enabling them to co-deploy with the Liberian police at all levels. The public 
information system also enabled the promotion of community policing practices 
(Aboagye & Bah 2004:11).  
The reform of the corrections system is tasked mainly to the transition 
government, with UNMIL filling an advisory role. This sector encounters 
considerable constraints, mainly by the lack of infrastructure and judicial 
personnel to administer justice. This is coupled with the weak ability of the 
transition government to carry the reform process forward (Aboagye & Bah 
2004:11).  
UNMIL also coordinated plans with the chief of justice to open courts through 
Liberia (SG report no. 3 2004:7).  
In sum, there is a virtually non-existent strategic planning, and mixed results 
in the operational planning of the components of rule of law.  
 
Elections: Planning for the end of the transition phase 
 
This activity is included in the analysis because elections are the crucial focal 
point for the ending of the transition phase. It is outlined in the Accra peace 
accord that elections should be held no later than October 2005. In this phase, as 
the initial security situation is stabilised, the planning commences. This activity 
will only have a planning stage in this phase. 
In order to fulfil the Accra peace agreement, the Liberian transition 
government is to prepare and hold elections with the support of UNMIL. This is 
channelled through the establishment of the National Elections Commission 
(NEC). A crucial aspect is that the repatriation of refugees needs to make 
considerable progress if they should be able to vote. A joint assessment mission 
was made, clarifying the UN and its partner’s role in the election. It was evident 
that the NEC needed substantial support to be able to fulfil its task. Crucial was 
material, staff and information capacity support. The UNMIL objectives were 
identified as assisting the conduct of credible elections and leave behind a 
Liberian management body that will rely less on international assistance in the 
following elections (SG progress report no.3 2004:10). In August, the draft for 
electoral reform legislation was delivered to the legislative assembly (SG progress 
report no.4 2004:9).  
This draft was delayed however, since the legislative assembly did not ratify 
the draft, and made several amendments that had to be vetoed by the chairman of 
the transition government. This delay of the electoral reform threatened the 
election process, as it delayed operative planning and voter education (SG 
progress report no.5 2004:9). 
It is clear that the transitional government works as a constraining factor to the 
planning of elections, since different instances of the government work against 
each other. This is clearly a consequence of the transition government being made 
up of former warring parties sharing power.  
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5.2.3 Implementation phase 2 
Demobilisation and rehabilitation 
 
After the resumed planning and preparations of the DDRR programme, it was 
finally re-launched with disarmament and demobilisation. Enabled by the 
comprehensive planning effort and the intensive information campaigns, the 
disarmament and demobilisation process went smooth without any major 
disturbances. Each UN agency was responsible for one part of the activities in 
each camp, utilising NGOs as implementing partners. The responsibilities are 
listed below (UNDP 2004:20): 
 
Cantonment Management – UNMIL/NCDDRR  
Food Management – WFP  
Pre-Discharge Orientation – UNDP  
Transport - UNDP  
Medical Screening – WHO  
Reproductive Health and Sexually Based Gender Violence – UNFPA  
Interim Care Centres – UNICEF  
Communication – UNDP 
  
It is clear that form followed function in the planning and implementation of the 
DD components. The integrated planning was followed by an integrated 
implementation were different expertise were responsible for different crucial 
services, and tasked these activities to NGOs and local organisations. The DD 
implementation showed some remarkable results, and 1 month after its official 
completion on 31 Oct, a total of 101,449 ex-combatants had been disarmed and 
demobilised. 27,892 weapons had been collected (SG progress report no.5 
2004:5). Due to the unexpected large quantity of ex-combatants and lax screening 
of applicants, the implementation had to make some changes, most notably by 
increasing staff volume and shortening the cantonment period of the 
demobilisation process from 2-3 weeks to just 4-5 days (UNDP 2004:21,47).  
The rehabilitation and reintegration programmes were not as carefully planned 
as the disarmament and demobilisation exercise. This is also evident in the 
implementation. Due to the overwhelming response to the DD programmes, and 
the subsequent shorter period of cantonment, the RR component was severely 
constrained. Funds from the UNDP trust fund were largely used for the DD 
process, and thus funds were lacking for the RR component. Of the planned 
stopgap projects discussed in the planning section, none were implemented 
(UNDP 2004:47), which resulted in that a large number of ex-combatants simply 
had to wait for their rehabilitation and reintegration to commence. In December 
2004, only 16,190 ex-combatants were absorbed by RR activities, and an 
additional 40,000 were planned for. This leaves 43,000 to be provided for, and a 
shortage of funds amounting to $60 million (SG report no.5 2004:6).  
Again, it is evident that a casual process of converging factors impact on the 
implementation of the programme, were the excessive focus on DD components 
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combined with the overwhelming response leaves the implementation of the RR 
components suboptimal and uncoordinated with the DD component.   
 
Humanitarian aid 
 
As the security umbrella is established, and the disarmament and demobilisation is 
creating safe environments in more and more counties, the humanitarian aid 
programmes expands through the country. In the implementation, I will focus on 
education, repatriation, and health and food aid. I will also make some common 
remarks regarding the operative field conditions and the role of cooperation.  
The operative field conditions, although enabled by the improvements in 
security, still faces numerous challenges. Due to the improved security conditions, 
a large number of refugees and IDPs return but live in camps (SG progress report 
no.3 2004:12). A serious constraint discussed in the OEF is the bad state of the 
road network, which makes deliveries and repatriations hard. This manifests itself 
in the repatriation of refugees and IDPs, where this is only possible on a small 
scale during the spring and summer due to the rainy season. In-field logistical 
cooperation is crucial in these instances, where UNMIL supports the UNHCR 
with airlifts (SG progress report no.3 2004:12). Large-scale repatriation becomes 
possible late in this analytical phase, in October 2004. This ordered repatriation is 
a collaborative effort by UNHCR and the transition government, with many 
NGOs as implementing partners (Fiawosime in Fiawosime & Bah 2005:167). At 
the end of 2004, some 150,000 refugees have been repatriated, including 5,500 
assisted voluntary returnees.  UNHCR and its partners also worked with 
community based reintegration activities to sustain the repatriation (Fiawosime in 
Fiawosime & Bah 2005:167).  
The UN structure also comes to its full potential in the rehabilitation of the 
schools. This was a truly collaborative effort, were UN agencies coordinated 
action to provide food, sanitation, facilities and education materials, and the 
repatriation of displaced teachers to get the schools running (SG progress report 
no.3 2004:13). This is also an important activity picking up the slack of the 
DDRR programme, as many combatants were child soldiers, and funds from the 
Quick impact projects are being used to attend to their needs (SG progress report 
no.4 2004:11). This programme reaches over 800,000 children, and 12,000 school 
teachers have completed and orientation programme. This is coupled with the 
supply of food, materials and sanitation (SG progress report no.4 and 5 2004).  
There is substantial ad-hoc, on the ground cooperation in this sector. The 
general trends are, due to the logistics constraints, that UNMIL assets are used 
broadly to facilitate aid delivery and repatriation (Fiawosime in Fiawosime & Bah 
2005:176). UNMIL lends these assets willingly, and indicates that the military 
component, in line with integrated theories, facilitates the establishment of viable 
conditions. However, due to the integrated structure and the integration of the 
humanitarian component into UNMIL, some NGOs are reluctant to use the help 
of UN agencies, as they think their neutrality is compromised. However, the 
principled stand of some NGOs hampers the prospect of an overall strategy, as the 
actors have various timetables and views of what humanitarian aid is and should 
  41 
comprise. The integrated mission as a structure provides both positive enablers in 
implementation, especially when UN resources are used, and a constraining factor 
in relation to some NGOs, as they distance themselves from UN agencies that 
they normally could cooperate with. 
 
Rule of law 
 
Based on the preparations made, operations to reform the police, prison and 
judicial system at the operational level are most notable. Regarding the reform of 
the Liberian police, the most notable implementation activities are the reopening 
of the Liberian police training college, and the retraining of 646 police officers by 
CIVPOL and relevant stakeholders (Aboagye & Bah 2004:11). Also, training of 
854 recruits is underway after a rigorous selection process coupled with the 
launching of the recruitment process in May (SG report no.3 2004:6). Thus, the 
implementation of the police reform is on track, and strengthened by the co-
deployment of CIVPOL and the Liberian police. 
The implementation of the reform of the court and penal system is slow 
however, and severely constrained by the bad shape of the facilities and lack of 
experienced personnel. 5 prisons were open during this second phase in Liberia 
(SG progress report no.5 2004:7). Prisons lacked basic sanitation, health care and 
food support, and were very overcrowded, resulting in several escapes and 
unacceptable conditions for inmates. This was somewhat relieved as the WFP and 
the ICRC stepped in to provide basic health and food services (SG progress report 
no.5 2004:7).  
The judicial reform was hampered by the lack of infrastructure and personnel, 
but some steps were implemented to improve the situation. Quick impact projects 
were used to reopen the law school, allowing for 400 students to resume their 
studies. The temple of justice in Monrovia is functioning and the Supreme Court 
is in the process of ruling in several cases (SG progress report no.4 2004:6). The 
judicial reform in Liberia is implemented at a slow rate, owing to lack of facilities 
and equipment, and skilled personnel (SG progress report no.5 2004:6). There is 
also a problem of wide-spread corruption and lack of competence and separation 
from political institutions, which hampers the judicial implementation.   
5.2.4 Output phase 2 
Demobilisation and reintegration: mismatch in performance 
 
When evaluating the performance of the DDRR implementation, it is clear that it 
was not implemented according to plan. The planning targeted 38,000 ex-
combatants, and over 100,000 were demobilised. This indicates that the eligibility 
criterion was not effectively enforced, especially when looking at the low man-to-
weapon ratio (UNDP 2004:19). When looking at the DD output alone, this 
indicates that the implementation was not according to plan, but very effective 
and successful in administering the process. However, this severely impacted on 
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the RR component, creating constrains leading to a very weak output, due to an 
overwhelming caseload and an acute lack of funding.  
 
Humanitarian aid: first steps towards rehabilitating the country 
 
When looking at the performance of the delivery of humanitarian aid, it is clear 
that considerable success can be noted, especially in the areas of health and 
education, owing much to the enabling integrated UN structure. Cooperation has a 
large role to play in these instances, although mostly at an operational and even ad 
hoc level. The performance is quite remarkable given that funding has been 
lacking, since the pledges made only have been paid to about 38% (SG report no.4 
2004:12). Thus synergies have been reached and competition over scarce 
resources has been kept at bay (Olson & Gregorian 2007:46). 
 
Rule of law: mismatch in performance 
 
As with the DDRR process, it is clear that there is a mismatch in performance 
between the components in this sector. The process of enhancing the Liberian 
police is performing quite well, under UNMIL leadership. But the judicial and 
penal reforms, led by the transition government, are lagging behind the progress 
with the police reforms. This was mainly attributed to mentioned constraining 
conditions and the weak performance of the transition government in 
implementing the projects. The performance is barely upheld by cooperation with 
WFP and NGOs in the penal sector. This mismatch in performance clearly 
demonstrates the lack of strategic direction of the rule of law process. 
Coordination and the use of quick impact projects contribute significantly to 
progress in the individual parts, but overall performance is hampered due to a lack 
of coordination, and divided responsibilities.  
5.2.5 Outcome phase 2 
Demobilisation and disarmament: impacts  
 
The skewed output had some serious ramifications for the impacts in the operation 
environment. It is here fruitful to conceptualise the impacts on a short-term and 
long-term basis. In the short-term, the unexpected quantity of the DD activities 
contributes vastly to reducing conflict drivers related to the presence of small 
arms and threat from ex-combatants and thus improving the security situation 
(MPICE 2008:16). To this end, the large inclusion in the DD process is an 
advantage.  
But in the long term, it is evident that the failure to rehabilitate and reintegrate 
the massive caseload of ex-combatants sustains the conflict driver it is intended to 
reduce, by failing to meet expectations and leaving demobilised ex-combatants in 
a frustrating limbo. This is a case in point of the inextricable link between security 
and development, and an interesting dilemma (Jennings 2007:212-213). The wide 
inclusion facilitates the stabilisation of security in the short term, but as it fails to 
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link to viable projects of development and a scope wide enough to address the 
larger community, the frustrations lead to a sustainment of the very conflict driver 
the programme was set out to reduce.  
A nation-wide survey confirms this analysis: the least integrated and those 
that had the worst situation was ex-combatants that was waiting for a 
rehabilitation and reintegration programme to commence (Pugel 2006:4-5). Thus, 
as frustration grows, so will the conflict driver. 
Another related aspect of the security – development link is the strategic 
coordination with other activities. The question here is, reintegration into what? 
Reintegration outpaced national recovery and development (UNDP 2004:48).  
What about the role of cooperation in producing these impacts? The integrated 
planning and coordinated implementation was a central causal factor in producing 
the short-term reduction of conflict drivers. Form followed function, and each part 
worked in a comprehensive manner to achieve remarkable result, that would have 
not been possible without all the components. However, coordination to strategic 
issues and long-term stabilisation continues to be difficult.  
The pattern seems to be that cooperation and coordination can produce 
positive outcomes in clear instances of burden-sharing with achievable and 
measurable results, but fail to coordinate the strategic issues and connect to long-
term development.  
 
Humanitarian aid: Success or failure? 
 
Impacts have been largely positive, especially in the sectors of health and 
education. This implementation impacts to create feasible living conditions and 
also picks up some of the slack from the DDRR programme. The deliveries made 
by the humanitarian aid programmes both diminishes the drivers of conflict 
associated with social disintegration, displacement and demographic pressures, 
and strengthens institutional performance by making basic necessities available 
and the provision of basic social services, most notably the school systems 
(MPICE 2008:43).  
It is also clear that cooperation had a major role in creating these positive 
impacts, especially since both financial and logistical constraints were present. 
The pattern is especially strong in technical areas, were form follows function. On 
more political issues, the opinions differ. The repatriation was viewed by some 
NGOs as a political project to ensure viable constituencies for upcoming elections 
(Olson & Gregorian 2007:47). This is telling of the lack of shared vision and 
strategic planning in this sector.  
Another pattern, albeit of moderate impact as the security situation and 
infrastructural conditions improve, is the constraining mechanism the integrated 
UN system play in relation to some NGOs, as they become reluctant to accepting 
UN support.  
 
Rule of law: mixed results 
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Due to the improved security situation and the training and patrolling of the 
Liberian police in cooperation with CIVPOL, order is restored and arrests are 
made possible. But the weak performance of the prison and judicial system means 
that prisons become overcrowded, and insecure, and weakens the judicial system 
since suspects are denied the right to a speedy trial due to the judicial shortages 
(Aboagye & Bah 2004:11). This leads to escapes, detrimental conditions in 
prisons with risks of abuse, and the release of prisoners for unduly long 
incarceration periods.  
The lack of strategic coordination and the inability to tackle the root problems 
in the legal systems hamper the impact. In short term, the progress in police 
reform means that security is strengthened mainly by the reform of the police, 
thus reducing conflict drivers associated with the use of national security forces 
for political repression (MPICE 2008:16). There is a positive impact owing both 
to reduction of conflict drivers and strengthening of institutional capacity related 
to establishing a safe and secure environment (MPICE 2008:16).  
However, due to the lack of progress concerning the penal and judicial system, 
and the lack of strategic coordination and comprehensive judicial reform, the 
overall strengthening of institutional performance remains absent in the impacts of 
this phase. Judicial independence and government accountability is still weak 
(MPICE 2008:25). Corruption and impunity are still present drivers of conflict, 
and thus there is weak reduction of these drivers of conflict (MPICE 2008:25). 
Although the symptoms are mildly addressed, the root causes (bad governance 
and political intervention in the justice system) are not addressed, which in long-
term impact can threat the establishment of the rule of law.  
The role of cooperation in creating positive impacts is clearly present at the 
operational level. However, it is clear that the lack of strategic coordination 
played a big part, in conjunction with the unwillingness of the transition 
government to initiate comprehensive reform, to hampering positive institution 
building impacts.  
 
Overall evaluation of impacts and the role of cooperation in phase 2  
 
To evaluate the overall impact in this phase, some clear progress has been made in 
restoring the Liberian society.  
A pattern of cooperative action in relation to positive outcomes begins to 
emerge. Form follows function, and where there are technical issues to be 
coordinated, cooperation delivers good results, even under a lack of funding and 
political constraints. However, these impacts are impeded by the lack of strategic 
coherence. The sum of the parts become less positive, as projects are not linked, 
and short-term positive outcomes are not transformed to steady long-term 
development. The mismatch in the DDRR programme is a case in point. This is 
further acerbated by the funding constraints present in all areas and the weak 
performance of the transitional government in dealing with corruption and 
restoring state capacity. There is a holistic casual process at the strategic level 
constraining the impacts made at the operational level. 
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However, the momentum gained at the operational level has enabled the 
planning of elections to pick up speed, and the progress made feeds into each 
other. Overall, this operational progress lays the ground for the accelerated 
elections preparations.  
5.3 Phase 3: Ending the transition period, December 
2005 – January 2006 
5.3.1 Operation Environment Framework phase 3 
The most notable change of the operation environment is the completion of the 
disarmament and demobilisation programme and the disbandment of the armed 
factions in Liberia, allowing for operations in programmes discussed in phase two 
to move into an accelerated pace. Also, the former armed factions turn a new leaf 
and form political parties or aligning themselves with existing political candidates 
or parties (SG progress report no.6 2005:1). This means that the conflict dynamics 
change and take a non-violent political shape. This is the most important reason 
for the changed dynamics in the operation environment that motivates an 
analytical phase-shift.  
There is a largely enabling security environment. But the long-term impact of 
the failure to connect the DD and RR activities is starting to manifest a new 
dynamic, were disgruntled ex-combatants awaiting reintegration is a constrainer 
and a source of tension (SG progress report no.6 2005:4). Although the security 
situation is generally stable, this dynamic is a real threat to progress. This is a 
constrainer for upcoming elections, as eruptions of violence can threaten the 
election process. Other constraining dynamics, which was already noted in phase 
2, is the composition of the transition government, which entails a government 
marred with factional disputes and corruption, frustrating UNMILs facilitating 
and supporting role. Inability to deal with this is a major concern, since a primary 
conflict driver in Liberia has been bad governance (see OEF phase 1). Limited 
resources are a major constraint, especially to the RR process.  The state of the 
roads in Liberia continues to be a logistical constraint, even more so during the 
rainy season, which affects the elections.  
However, the progress made in the previous phase of training police, 
delivering community services and repatriating refugees instil a state of normalcy 
and laying the enabling ground for the upcoming election. Two other enabling 
factors in relation to the elections is, firstly, that the political transformation of the 
former armed factions impact much on security and stability, but relatively little 
on the political landscape. The factions are mostly aligned with existing 
candidates or form parties of little influence, or simply dissolve (Harris 2006:376-
377). The second and most important enabling factor is that there is no incumbent 
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government with power and resources participating in the political election, due to 
the stipulations in the Accra peace accord (Harris 2006:377). This creates a 
political structural condition in which the playing field is relatively level and 
dominated by civilian actors, not associated with rebel groups and the transition 
government. No actor can control the security situation either, which was the case 
with Taylor in the previous elections in 1997 (Harris 2006:377).  
5.3.2 Planning/Decision phase 3 
As the elections start to draw near, focus is on making the necessary preparations 
to conclude the transition period with an election in October. The weak 
performance of the transition government and the constraints it has exhibited also 
draws much attention in the planning and decision-making activities in this phase. 
The activities traced in phase 2 continue to be implemented, and thus have no 
planning activities relevant for this final phase. 
 
Dealing with a primary constrainer: Steps to manage corruption and 
economic malpractice 
 
As a result of pressure from donors, attention is given to the weak performance of 
the transition government, the lack of transparency and corruption being two 
major problems. The most crucial activity in this phase coupled with alleviating 
the discussed constraint is the development of the Governance and Economic 
Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) for Liberia. This plan was a 
robust intervention into the government affairs in Liberia, and was developed in 
collaboration between Liberia’s international partners such as the World Bank, 
UN, EU, IMF, ECOWAS, and the transition government (Dwan & Bailey 
2006:6). In the planning and discussions leading up to the establishment of the 
GEMAP in September 2005, political tensions came to the fore, and the draft 
made so far was rejected (Dwan & Bailey 2006:12). This shows the problem of 
combining technical planning of the GEMAP with the sensitive political nature of 
the process, which caused tension. This was further acerbated by the lack of 
strategic plans regarding the UN role in governance reform (Dwan & Bailey 
2006:12-13). The transition government’s opposition was finally broken down 
with international pressure in form of threats of aid withdrawals (Dwan & Bailey 
2006:13-14). Due to the late signing in September, GEMAP setup was slow and a 
hampered by the ongoing elections. The elections had to be settled before any 
progress could be made (Dwan & Bailey 2006:14).  
This means that crucial steps were taken to dissolve one crucial constrainer to 
Liberia’s development, but as the planning convened with the elections, no 
implementation or impact could be made in the transition period. The constraint 
was still present in this phase, and the attitude of the new government determines 
the fate of GEMAP. However, it is a promising tool for economic development, 
since it is linked to existing frameworks and peace processes, and also an action 
plan for the lifting of UN sanctions (Dwan & Bailey 2006:16).  
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This was in many aspects an integrated planning process, with the 
incorporation of donors, stakeholders both national and international, and civil 
society. It also connects to the general peace process and has an inclusive 
oversight mechanism with genuine authority (Dwan & Bailey 2006:21-22).  
 
Elections: Establishing a condition from which political outcomes can be 
decided 
 
As the ground work was laid in the previous phase with the submission of the 
electoral reform, the planning picks up pace with the ratification of the electoral 
reform in mid- December. The planning continues with the National Elections 
Commission taking lead and is supported by UNMIL. Legal and policy 
frameworks are developed through the adoption of guidelines for registration of 
political parties, alliances and independent candidates (SG progress report no.6 
2005:10). The timetable for the elections was announced in February; Voter 
registration was to be conducted from 25 April to 21 May, and exhibited from 27 
June to 1 July. The elections will be held on 11 October and results announced on 
26 October (SG progress report no.6 2005:11).  
As the timetable is set and the legal framework developed, operational 
planning ensues, with relevant stakeholders participating to ensure the smooth 
running of elections. UNMIL and NEC, in collaboration with other international 
agencies, both IGOs and NGOs, is preparing the voter registration exercise, which 
mainly focus on logistical and administrative issues (SG progress report no.6 
2005:11). UNMIL also hold information campaigns and community outreach, this 
was crucial to deliver relevant information on registration and voting in a country 
of low accessibility and a high illiteracy rate (IRI report 2005:8-9). Planning and 
coordination of security is also launched. UNMIL has a substantial role here, both 
as security umbrella and logistical support. UNMIL also supports the national 
police with mentoring and monitoring (SG progress report no.6 2005:11). UNDP 
collaborates with the National Democratic Institute for the involvement of civil 
society groups in carrying out a civic and voter education programme (SG 
progress report no.6 2005:11).  
With the electoral reform as an enabling planning framework for the 
operational planning, the preparations for the elections are rigorous and on track. 
It is also clear that a high level of coordination is achieved through the 
involvement of international partners, local authorities, civil society and the 
UNMIL.  
5.3.3 Implementation phase 3 
It is noteworthy that the implementation of most programmes are now geared 
towards making the elections work smoothly and credible.  
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Rehabilitation and reintegration: shortage of funds  
 
The primary constrainer for the implementation in this phase is the acute lack of 
funds, due to the disparities in the output in the previous phase. Only about 25,500 
ex-combatants participated in reintegration projects at the beginning of the year. 
There were several projects planned for and in the pipeline since the previous 
phase that provides opportunities for 44,500 additional ex-combatants. This 
situation was somewhat alleviated as referral and counselling offices were 
opened, disseminating information and assisting ex-combatants in enlisting to 
reintegration opportunities, and as funds were made available, the amount of ex-
combatants not enlisted in reintegration projects declined to 26,000 (SG progress 
report no.8 2005:5). However, these combatants need to be provided opportunities 
to ensure that security is strengthened and development is kept on track. 
 
Humanitarian aid: Repatriating refugees  
 
As the elections draws near, efforts were concentrated on repatriating IDPs and 
creating feasible conditions for their reintegration, this will be the primary focus 
of this phase, as other programmes generally continue as they did in phase 2. The 
accelerated repatriation enabled by improved security conditions, was a 
coordinated effort involving many implementing agencies and connected to other 
activities of development and reintegration to ensure viable and orderly conditions 
for the return. UNHCR provided the transportation and non-food items while 
WFP has provided food rations, and UNMIL increased patrols to guarantee 
security. UNMIL also supported the return with transport and occasional airlifts 
when needed, as the rainy season and bad roads constrained the effort. These 
returns are supported by broader reintegration programmes under the RFTF, with 
rebuilding of roads, schools and clinics in the area of return (SG progress report 
no.7 2005:12-13). Community based reintegration projects are also implemented.  
This coordinated implementation links the short-term repatriation goals with 
broader society integration. At the end of the year and phase 3, about 232,500 
IDPs had received repatriation support (SG progress report no.9 2005:14).  
 
Rule of law 
 
The work with restoring the judicial, penal and police services continue, albeit 
largely in the same pattern noted in phase 2. However, due to the coming 
elections, more attention is given to the training and deployment of police, as the 
goal set out of 1800 police in time for the elections draws near. The overall 
implementation continues to be slow, and the pattern is partial and piecemeal in 
its approach. The important constrainers manifesting themselves in the 
implementation is the lack of funding and the continued bad governance of the 
transition government.  
The most substantial implementation activity is found in the training and 
deployment of the new Liberian police force. The target was reached in time of 
the elections, and thus facilitated the election process (SG progress report no.9 
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2005:7). The police are also deployed to all counties in Liberia (SG progress 
report no.8 2005:6).  
The implementation of rebuilding the judicial and penal systems are running 
slow, and the transition government are still not able to provide for acceptable 
standards in the six prisons running in the country (SG progress report no.6 
2005:8). There have been some achievements in the judicial system, as 20 new 
circuit-court judges and magistrates were assigned to 145 courts. UNMIL quick 
impact projects were used to rebuild many of the deteriorated courts and provide 
material, but there is still an acute lack of trained personnel, equipment and 
facilities (SG progress report no.8 2005:10).  
The patterns in phase 2 are very much present in this phase too. The 
supporting role of UNMIL and its partners is frustrated by the lack of funds 
needed to make headway in the programmes and the weak capacity and dedication 
of the transition government also hampers progress.  
 
Elections: Completing the transition 
 
The implementation of the elections operates in a both constraining and enabling 
environment. The major constraints are the bad road conditions present in the 
country and the potential security threat from ex-combatants seeking to derail the 
election process. Both these constraints create a heavy reliance on UNMIL assets. 
The enablers are clearly the level playing field and the rigorous preparations made 
involving a multitude of actors. A special mention should be made of the 
incorporation and training of civil-society actors who serve as monitors, educators 
and administrative staff, thus securing local participation and legitimacy (IRI 
report 2005:15). 
The implementation started as scheduled with voter registration in April to 
May. The general impression was that voter registration functioned well and 
smoothly, due to good preparations and the coordinated effort of the involved 
actors (IRI report 2005:8). UNMIL logistical support was crucial to the 
implementation (IRI report 2005:15). The national police with support from 
UNMIL provided perimeter security, resulting in a calm implementation with no 
major incidents reported. During the registration process, some 1.3 million voters 
were registered (SG progress report no.7 2005:7). There was some political 
commotion in this stage of implementation, as the legislative assembly of the 
transition government adopted a resolution calling for an extension of the voter 
registration period, but the NEC rejected this and the Supreme Court supported 
theNEC’s position (SG progress report no.7 2005:7-8).  
As this process was completed, the nomination of candidates was concluded 
when the NEC approved of 22 presidential candidates and 22 vice-presidential 
candidates, 205 senate candidates and 513 house of representative candidates. The 
campaigning started on 15 August and was generally peaceful. The process 
continues to be hallmarked by cooperation and coordination at all levels, from 
senior technical assistance to the NEC down to information campaigns and 
education run by NGOs and UN agencies (SG progress report no.8 2005:8-9).  
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Two political events in the implementation threatened the process and 
timetable to a lesser extent. The Supreme Court ordered the NEC to allow each 
voter to cast two votes for the two senatorial seats in each county, and also 
ordered the NEC to allow two candidates to remedy their nomination papers 
during a period of seven days. This decision would mean that the elections would 
have to be postponed, and violate the peace accord. This was solved through 
ECOWAS mediation, were the candidates agreed to step down. The first decision 
was implemented by re-educating voters and did not affect the timetable, thanks 
to the support of civil society and the information mechanisms in place (SG 
progress report no.9 2005:2).  
The voting commenced on 11 October and was generally orderly and 
peaceful, which mainly can be ascribed to the disappearance of combat forces and 
the robust UNMIL and police presence (Harris 2006:377). The structural threat 
present from disgruntled ex-combatants did not manifest, reasonably due to the 
tight security and some progress in the reintegration and rehabilitation process. 
The elections were deemed as free and fair, and the impartiality of the NEC was 
commendable (Harris 2006:378), removing the constraint posed by a fractioned 
transition government. UNMIL capacities were also well coordinated and used.  
The voter turnout was 74.9%, and interestingly, almost exactly half of the 
voters were women (Harris 2006:380-381). Polling officials were well-trained and 
acted competently to support the voting process based on NEC guidelines (IRI 
report 2005:11). This was crucial given the difficulty of reaching all with 
information in the rural areas. Nine parties won seats in the senate, and eleven 
parties and seven independent candidates in the House of Representatives (SG 
progress report no.9 2005:2). No presidential candidate received over 50% of the 
votes, meaning that a run-off election was held between the two candidates with 
the most votes, which was George Weah and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (SG progress 
report no.9 2005:2). Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was declared winner and obtained 
59.4% of the votes. Allegations were made by the runner-up of massive fraud. 
This was resolved when the NEC ruled that the result was valid and only minor 
technical errors were present in the elections (SG progress report no.10 2006:1). 
Weah stepped down, and on 16 January 2006, Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf was sworn in 
as president of Liberia (SG progress report no.6 2006:2), putting an end to the 
transition period and the election process. She is the first female head of state in 
Africa. 
5.3.4 Output phase 3 
Rehabilitation and reintegration: Constrainers in operation 
 
Implementation was clearly constrained due to the lack of funds for projects. This 
clearly shows the ramifications of not applying a strict screening standard in the 
DD programme in phase 2, resulting in a big caseload of ex-combatants and the 
depletion of funds, which constrains the implementation in this phase. The actions 
in the previous phase constrained the output in this phase, in exemplifying how 
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the analytical model works in regard to path dependence. Performance was thus 
hampered by the funding deficit, and only after contributions outside of the 
original budget was made, could the ex-combatants receive new opportunities. 
This output contributed greatly to the elections being secured. 
 
Humanitarian aid: enabling refugees to vote 
 
Given the funding constraints present, the performance of the repatriation and 
rehabilitation process is commendable, and the utilisation of RFTF programmes in 
conjunction with repatriation activities coordinated between relevant support 
functions contributed to making the accelerated repatriation a success. However, 
there were diverging opinions on this issue, as some NGOs though that security 
and support structures were lacking for the IDPs, and that repatriation mainly was 
motivated by ensuring electoral participation. This diverging view clearly 
illustrates the lack of shared strategy and vision (Olson & Gregorian 2007:47).  
 
Rule of law: ensuring safe elections 
 
The training of the Liberian police reached its goal and can be seen as a success, 
contributing to the output of the elections and enabling a safe and secure voting 
process. However, the pattern of ill-coordinated cross programme implementation 
endures. In individual programmes, some headway is made, but it is mostly 
piecemeal. The use of UNMIL quick impact projects are a good alleviating 
mechanisms in lack of funding, and the NGO contributions to the prison system is 
also crucial, but overall, the constraints of the lack of commitment, both in form 
of funds and will from the transition government, make the overall output weak, 
and frustrates the improvements on the operational level. 
 
Elections: A veritable success 
 
When evaluating the performance of the elections implementation, it is clear that 
it was a great success; the elections were described as free, fair and transparent 
(SG progress report no.9 2005:3, IRI report 2005:15). It was also held within the 
established time-frame. The commendable work and impartial role of the NEC 
was a big enabler, functioning as an alleviator of the constraint present in the 
fractional and weak transition government. The logistical constraints was 
effectively handled by UNMIL planning and resources, and security was 
successfully enforced. The successful performance was also enabled by the 
converging implementation in the other programmes, with the repatriation of 
IDPs, the deployment of the Liberian police and the increased rehabilitation 
efforts in the DDRR programme. With the initial conditions observed, the absence 
of former armed factions and government meddling in the process coupled with 
the good performance of the NEC, the strong coherence and cooperation in 
planning to operational implementation led to Liberia’s post-conflict election 
becoming free, fair and peaceful, and an encouraging end to the transition phase.  
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5.3.5 Outcomes phase 3 
Rehabilitation and reintegration: alleviating security constraints 
 
The funds made available in this phase meant that more ex-combatants could start 
their reintegration programmes. This clearly contributed to diminishing the 
security threat posed by this volatile group. This impact converged to produce the 
positive output of the election process.  
To evaluate this impact, it is clear those reintegration programmes of ex-
combatants picks up the slack left by the DD components and sustains the 
reduction of conflict drivers, by reducing social disintegration for this volatile 
group (MPICE 2008:43) and thus diminishing the threat from ex-combatants to 
the operation environment (MPICE 2008:16). However, it is vital that the 
remaining ex-combatants will be offered viable opportunities to sustain these 
impacts.  
The role of cooperation in facilitating the positive outcome in this phase is 
somewhat limited. Success was based on projects already being in the pipeline, 
thus building on cooperative measures taken in phase 2 planning, and, most 
importantly, the donations made to facilitate these projects.  
This indicates that cooperation, while being an important feature for effective 
delivery, is no replacement for sustained commitment and funding by donors.  
 
Humanitarian aid: enabling voter participation 
 
The impact made in the short term by the repatriation of the IDPs is that they were 
enabled to vote and therefore enabled the election process and made it more 
representative and fair However, a side-effect impact was that land disputes 
became more common, and since the judicial system was still underdeveloped, 
this introduced a new conflict dynamic.  
Thus, the evaluation of the impact is mixed, since it on one hand contributes 
by further diminishing the drivers of conflict associated with social disintegration, 
displacement and demographic pressures, and strengthens institutional 
performance by making basic necessities available and the provision of basic 
social services (MPICE 2008:43). But on the other hand, these disputes could lead 
to violence if mechanisms for dealing with these conflicts are not in place.  
The cooperative and synced efforts clearly made this large repatriation 
possible, where agencies pooled resources and contributed with factored 
competence adding up to the impact.  
 
Rule of law: enabling secure elections 
 
It is clear that the impacts made by the deployment of the police clearly 
contributed to the elections being safe and non-violent. But overall, the judicial 
system is far from operational. This is problematic in relation to the repatriation of 
IDPs through the country, increasing land disputes and posing threats to the 
security environment (SG report no.6 2005:4). As the court systems are not fully 
operative, these problems have to be dealt with by alternate means. 
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When evaluating the impact made, it is clear that the successful deployment of 
police contributes to the establishment of a safe and secure environment, both by 
reducing conflict drivers associated with police being used as a tool of repression, 
and also strengthening the institutional capacity by increasing the performance of 
the national security forces, and public order and safety is also strengthened 
relating to rule of law institutional capacity (MPICE 2008:16, 25). However, the 
piecemeal implementation and lack of strategic direction makes the impact on the 
overall establishment of rule of law marginal. The justice system still does not 
operate at acceptable levels, and the patterns in phase 2 repeat itself (see 5.2.5). 
The role of cooperation is, as in phase two, limited to the operational setting, 
where UNMIL and CIVPOL provides support to ongoing processes, and NGOs 
help the running of the prisons. The lack of strategic integration, in conjunction 
with the initial conditions of lack of funding and bad national governance leads to 
a hampered holistic impact.  
 
Elections 
 
As pointed out, the success of the elections is a positive end to the transition 
period. The impact is most importantly the removal of the fractional and 
ineffective transition government. The result of the elections impacts as a positive 
enabler, since executive authority in Liberia is strong, and the elections removed 
the factional interest from this power position. This produced a good framework 
for the implementation of development in the continued efforts. At the same time, 
the results of the elections led to a diverse and mixed composition of the 
legislative instances, balancing the executive power and thus providing ground for 
reconciliation and compromise (Harris 2006:393).  
Moving on to impact evaluation, it is clear that the smooth implementation 
and result of the elections both reduce conflict drivers and strengthen institutional 
capacity. In the sector of political moderation and stable democracy, conflict 
drivers are reduced by diminishing the competition for exclusive power, and 
adherence to the peace settlement is strong as the elections was an important 
benchmark and the results were accepted (MPICE 2008:8). The institutional 
capacity is strengthened as the elections made a considerable contribution to 
government legitimacy and accountability. The involvement of civil society also 
strengthened citizen participation (MPICE 2008:8). The vibrant plethora of 
political parties also indicates a strengthening of institutional performance, as the 
elections were for civilians by civilians, and political issues are resolved 
peacefully (MPICE 2008:8,13-14). 
Cooperation had a major role in the production of these positive outcomes and 
the success of the election process. The coherence and cooperation, from planning 
and framework level to operational level managed to capitalize on the initial 
enabling conditions of the absence of an incumbent government and former 
fighting factions in the elections process. Logistical and security constraints were 
effectively dealt with through cooperation, and disputes were mitigated. Synergies 
between programmes, such as the successful repatriation of IDPs, contributed to 
the positive outcome. Again, the pattern is clear that coordination of concrete and 
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operational issues produce positive outcomes, but even more interesting was the 
coordination in the planning stages that managed to ensure synergies rather than 
hampered effects. 
 
Overall evaluation of impacts and the role of cooperation in phase 3 
 
It is clear that the holding of free and fair elections, resulting in the removal of the 
transition government is a milestone in the path towards viable peace. This impact 
clearly enables the continued work for UNMIL and the new government, as the 
transition government was a main constrainer, and a primary conflict driver in 
Liberia’s war was bad governance. Regarding the elections, the overall holistic 
development impacts were supportive. However, they were still operating in a 
constraining manner regarding the rule of law, as the police reform successes 
were not matched by the judicial or penal reform. This problem was further 
acerbated in the face of land disputes when IDPs returned, as a legal conflict 
resolution mechanism was absent in many places.  
The role of cooperation was quite outstanding in the contribution to positive 
outcomes, as stakeholders cooperating to a large extent, made the election process 
and repatriation of refuges possible through effective coordination. The pattern 
still stands that form follows function and coordination is brought to its full 
potential in the handling of technical issues. The convergence of impacts towards 
elections was also consistent with this pattern, as effort where coordinated to a 
clear and achievable aim set in time.  
However, in the DDRR programme, it is clear that the boost of funds was the 
driving force behind successful implementation and positive outcomes. This 
shows that cooperation can only take it so far, and doesn’t replace sustained 
commitment in funding and good governance.  Again, the rule of law activities 
and its impacts were overall hampered primarily due to the weak performance of 
the transition government. 
5.4 Assessing overall impacts of the transition period  
As the final phase of the process-tracing of the transition period is concluded, an 
overall evaluation of the impact achieved will be made in relation to the MPICE 
model. The overall role of cooperation and discernable patterns in the transition 
phase will be evaluated in the conclusions in chapter 6.  
UNMIL has completed many aspects of its initial mandate, and made progress 
towards completing remaining key tasks. The presence of 15,000 military and 
1,115 police personnel had made a substantial impact in establishing the enabling 
security environment necessary for sustained development. Programmes have 
made several steps towards sustainable peace, including repatriation of IDPs and 
refugees, and the completion of the disarmament and demobilisation programme. 
In making an overall assessment, it is fruitful to recapitulate the MPICE stages 
concept, were the transition period can be conceptualised as moving from stage 0, 
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imposed stability, to stage 1, assisted stability (see figure 7 below), where 
consolidation and subsequently drawdown of the intervening force becomes 
possible (MPICE 2008:5). UNMIL is currently in the drawdown phase (SG 
progress report no.18 2009), indicating that stage 1 is becoming more 
consolidated. 
 
Political Moderation & Stable Democracy 
Security 
Rule of Law 
Economic Sustainability 
Social Well-being 
          STAGE 0    STAGE I                     STAGE II 
Figure 7: Major mission elements of conflict transformation and stabilization (MPICE Metrics Framework 2008:5) 
 
However, key areas remain to be consolidated, not least the establishment of rule 
of law, economic sustainability and state authority through Liberia, to ensure 
viable and subsequent self-sustaining peace. UNMIL, its partners and the Liberian 
government has an enabling ground to stand on, in the achievements made, not 
least since the transition government was one of the key constrainers to progress 
in many instances.  
This also highlights the dilemma present in the transition period of reducing 
conflict drivers and strengthening institutional capacity at the same time, as was 
discussed in chapter 2. UNMIL’s role was primarily supportive and enabling, and 
the efforts were often frustrated by the transition government’s poor performance 
and will. The establishment of GEMAP put this dilemma in the light. Deemed 
necessary for sustained development and ridding Liberia of rampant corruption, it 
is also an intrusive and powerful intervention. This illustrates the sensitive balance 
between reducing conflict drivers and strengthening institutional capacity. The 
pattern seems to be that UNMIL fared much better in reducing conflict drivers 
than in strengthening institutional capacity, with the DDRR programme being a 
case in point. This is partly explainable by the period studied being a transition 
phase, and naturally focus is firstly on establishing favourable conditions, but the 
link between security and development manifests as failure to strengthen 
institutional capacity will nullify the reduction of conflict drivers in the long-term 
impacts. This also highlights the crucial role of the national government, as it is 
the main vehicle for institutional capacity, and thus sustained peace and 
development. 
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6 Conclusions 
In this final chapter, I will reconnect to my research questions and aims stipulated 
in the beginning of the thesis, and draw upon the discernable patterns in the 
analysis to answer the questions and reflect on the research aim. Focus will firstly 
be on patterns of cooperation leading to positive outcomes. Secondly, as this was 
a theory developing and testing case study, the analytical model will be evaluated 
as a tool for process-tracing. 
6.1 The link between cooperation and positive 
outcomes: emerging patterns 
In light of the process-tracing performed using the analytical framework outlined 
in chapter 4, it is clear that some interesting patterns of cooperation in relation to 
outcomes can be discerned.  
Cooperation between multidimensional actors, such as military, UN agencies 
and NGOs lead to positive outcomes mainly in the operative setting, where there 
is a clear and achievable short-term outcome.  
The dominant pattern is that form follows function, meaning that in 
programmes and activities that require a mixed set of competencies and technical 
expertise (such as disarmament and demobilisation), cooperation is brought about 
and crucial to reach the positive outcome, as this outcome is dependent on many 
aspects and converging variables to be realised. The integrated structure of 
UNMIL and the enabling UN system with its full set of capabilities are 
manifested in the set-up of joint coordinating mechanisms, which enables in field 
cooperation and production of positive outcomes through the convergence of 
outputs in distinct areas of expertise. The elections are a case in point, were 
cooperative causal processes at many levels converged to produce the positive 
impact. Legal frameworks were negotiated, along with security planning, 
repatriation of IDPs, administrative education, information campaigns and 
observer missions. This pattern is consistent over the programmes and activities 
traced in the analysis. Largely, cooperation depends on the initial condition of an 
enabling security environment. The first failure in the disarmament and 
demobilisation in phase 1 speaks its clear language.  
The major constrainers to cooperative action, impeding positive impacts are 
clearly a lack of funding and bad domestic governance. This is confirmed by the 
pattern that cooperation had a major role in the reduction of conflict drivers, but 
generally had little impact on overall strengthening of institutional capacity. As 
that process is long-term and more political in its nature, it is also harder to 
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coordinate and require domestic government commitment. Cases to this point that 
can be compared are the rule of law programme, were activities under the 
responsibility of the government failed to induce progress, and the elections, were 
the commended role of the National Elections Commission and its hard work 
greatly enabled progress by establishing legal frameworks in cooperation with 
international partners, and driving on implementation.  
This leads me to a very important remark. Cooperation and comprehensive 
approaches are not the holy grail of peacekeeping, as the attention it receives in 
research and policy today would suggest. It cannot replace sustained commitment 
by adequate funding, enabling mandates and good and responsible governance. 
This was also evident in the analysis, as the best results were achieved in 
instances were activities were well-funded, and drew support of the domestic 
government, and conversely, the least positive impacts were made when bad 
governance and lack of funding hampered the process, as with the rule of law 
sector and the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants. Lack of funding 
and bad domestic governance tends to be somewhat endemic of peace support 
operations. Bad governance often is the problem in the first place and peace 
agreements tend to reflect the interests of the belligerent parties, and that peace 
support operations in at least the UN system relies on the flickering political will 
of the international community. But it is just because these initial constraining 
conditions that integration and coherence are needed on a strategic level, since 
strategy basically is about prioritising efforts and allocating funds based on a 
defined overarching goal (Eide et al 2005:19), and coordination can compensate 
for lack of funds, as in the humanitarian sector in phase 2. There has to be a 
shared understanding of the ends, ways and means through the operation from day 
one to deal with these deficiencies. As noted in the analysis, cooperation on short-
term and highly technical issues contributed immensely to positive direct impacts, 
but the lack of coherence at the strategic level hampered these efforts, most 
notably in the DDRR programme, but also in the rule of law sector, as the 
different part were not delivering and performing as one, leading to hampered 
positive impacts or even an increase in conflict drivers, as with the ex-combatants. 
Given that the UN had a supportive role, coherent strategies become even more 
important, especially in relation to the domestic government.  
 This is also true as the reduction of conflict drivers and strengthening of 
institutional capacity requires a delicate balance.  
To summarize and revert to the research question in chapter 1: 
 
What is the role of integration, coherence and cooperation between 
multidimensional actors in the production of positive outcomes in peace support 
operations? 
 
Cooperation, enabled by integrated command structures, is a primary driver in the 
production of positive outcomes in the operational setting, where there is a clear 
and achievable short-term outcome and form follows function. The lack of 
coherence at the strategic level, in conjunction with lack of funding and weak 
political support, hampers the transition from short-term partial gains to 
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sustainable and holistic positive impact. Lack of funding and bad governance is 
primary drivers while the lack of strategic coherence intervenes and acerbates 
these structural constraints.   
6.1.1 Specification of hypothesis 
I also stated in chapter 1 that one important aim was a specification of the 
hypothesis: 
 
Coherence, integration and cooperation in the intervention process will lead to 
positive outcomes.  
 
Based on the emerging patterns and the answer to the research question, it is 
formulated in the following way: 
 
Cooperation, enabled by integrated command structures, will lead to positive 
outcomes on the operative level where there is a clear and achievable short-term 
aim. Lack of coherence at the strategic level will hamper the transition to long-
term, sustainable positive outcomes, enforcing the primary drivers; lack of 
funding and bad governance. 
 
This hypothesis can now be lifted to new cases to be further validated, 
complemented, or rejected. 
6.1.2 Building block case study: contributions and implications 
As stated in the research design, this was a building block case study of the most 
likely type. In this section, the contributions of this thesis in relation to existing 
research and the implications of the most likely case selection are discussed.  
The main contribution, complementing the findings of Egnell (2007) is 
showing that cooperation in the operational setting, facilitated by integrated 
structures along the integrated theoretical strand will lead to positive outcomes in 
short-term. Together with the findings of Egnell that stipulates that integration and 
cooperation will lead to improved operational conduct, this implies that 
cooperation and integration in interventions will lead to higher effectiveness (as it 
both enhances operational conduct and the ability to produce positive outcomes), 
and also under what conditions as stipulated in my hypothesis.  
Another important contribution is the affirmation of the strategic deficit and 
the weak link between the strategic and operative level discussed in the 
introduction to chapter 1. 
As this was a most likely case-study, there are some implications for the 
contributions above. The conclusions drawn and the specified hypothesis about 
the link between cooperation, coherence and integration to positive outcomes 
need to be further tested. This was an initial probing study to identify initial 
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patterns. Moving on, more tough test can be made, preferably outside the UN 
structure were institutional integration is weaker, or in more straining conflict 
settings.  
Quite alarming is the lack of strategic coherence even in this most likely case. 
This suggests that the strategic deficit and the weak link between the strategic and 
operational setting is strongly validated. A key policy focus should therefore be to 
develop shared understandings and enabling institutional setups that fosters 
coherence over the ends, ways and means early or even prior to future operations.  
6.2 Evaluation of the analytical framework 
As this was a theory-evolving and theory testing case study in the sense that an 
analytical framework was developed and applied in the analysis, an evaluation of 
this framework is appropriate. The overall ground for evaluation is based on the 
framework’s ability to operationalise the overall methodology of process-tracing. 
To get a base to stand on for evaluation, I will recapitulate a quote used earlier: 
 
“To identify the process, one must perform the difficult cognitive feat of figuring 
out which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which 
simple principles of the many that may be at work, would have combined to 
generate the observed sequence of events.” (George & Bennett 2005:206, 
emphasis added) 
 
With this and the performed analysis as the background, the framework, by 
utilising spiral causality and emphasising the interplay between structure and 
agency progressing in phases over assorted activities of the policy and 
implementation process, was able to trace the sequence of events and identify 
initial structural conditions, and which manifested agency processes that in 
conjunction led to the unfolding sequence of events and impacts. It was able to 
identify instances of short-term successful impacts transforming to long-term 
negative impacts, path dependence and converging implementation leading to 
gradual change (see for example the DDRR programme, where initial lax 
screening had path dependent effects on the RR parts, and rule of law, where 
multiple processes mixed impact hampered overall holistic impact in conjunction 
with structural constrainers). Thus it functions well as a tool for process-tracing.  
The weakness identified is that it mainly is an analytical framework for 
monitoring and process-tracing, and need to be complemented if evaluation and 
theoretical assertions are to be made. The MPICE model proved to be a valuable 
complementing tool for assessing impacts. But this lack of evaluation mechanisms 
in the framework could also be a strength, as it can be applied in many settings 
and function to study diverse cases of implementation and decision-making, 
provided that evaluative tools are added.  
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6.3 A final remark 
As this concluded the thesis, a final reflection on linking and evaluating outcomes 
is in place. It has been pointed out in existing research (for example Egnell 2007) 
that evaluating outcomes are indeed a difficult effort. The process in Liberia does 
not end where this thesis does, and the final word is not said. Long-term 
sustainable development and peace is still not secured. Thus, the final outcome is 
not yet revealed. However, as crises and protracted conflicts continue to mount, I 
sincerely question the “wait and see” approach. Tools for monitoring and 
evaluation are desperately needed, enabling linkages to be made and best practices 
to be established. It is imperative for securing a viable future for peace support 
operations.  
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7 Executive summary 
Outline of the thesis 
 
In the contemporary complex conflict environment, operations often take place in 
fragile or failed states, with a wide range of goals beyond humanitarian relief and 
security stabilisation. In these complex situations, security and development are 
inextricably linked. This calls for a broad, multifunctional and coherent 
engagement. The best form of these engagements is yet to be formalised. There is 
a gap between strategic planning and multifunctional implementation, and there is 
also a deficit in studies supporting the notion that coherence and integration will 
lead to higher effectiveness and positive outcomes. This is based on the lack of 
tools for monitoring and evaluation. 
 
In light of the identified deficits above, the aims of this thesis are too develop a 
framework for monitoring and evaluation and apply this in a case study, to test the 
following hypothesis:  
 
Coherence, integration and cooperation in the intervention process will lead to 
positive outcomes.  
 
The research question guiding the analysis is the following:  
 
What is the role of integration, coherence and cooperation between 
multidimensional actors in the production of positive outcomes in peace support 
operations? 
 
The case study uses the method of process tracing, which is a useful tool for 
investigating the relationship between cause and effect in complex processes 
where diverse phenomena interact. Process-tracing is best described as detective 
work, where evidence is investigated and put in sequence and compared to 
hypotheses, to generate an explanation of the sequence of events producing effect. 
The use of this method makes it possible to go beyond the verification or rejection 
of the hypothesis above and move to specification, i.e. under what conditions 
integration, coherence and cooperation produce positive outcomes.  
 
Theoretical underpinnings  
 
In order to create an analytical framework, conceptualisations have to be made 
about how operations involving multiple actors are understood and, most 
importantly what constitutes viable and positive outcome in complex peace 
support operations. Theories about the civil-military dilemma, how to reconcile a 
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military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military 
subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do, are 
investigated to get an understanding of cooperation dynamics and how to 
conceptualise the role of peace support operations in contemporary conflicts. Two 
main theoretical strands are identified advocating two different approaches. The 
divided approach argues for the separation of the civilian and the military, giving 
the military space to develop a professional ethic and define their function 
according to objective security threats. The integrated approach argues for 
integration of the civilian and military institutions, since the military has to be 
sensitive to political will since the political will guides the military’s function and 
defines what a security threat is.  
 
In applying this to the contemporary setting, were conflict often is a result of the 
lack of political institutional capacity, it is clear that the function of the military is 
to attain political objectives by other means, since peace support operations have 
far-reaching development objectives. Thus the function is defined by the political, 
and the integrated approach fits these situations. This prescribes that an integrated 
approach should lead to higher effectiveness, but how is not evident, and thus 
motivates the research question. Ultimately, the functional imperative and 
evaluation of the utility of integrated civil – military relations lies in the ability to 
produce outcomes according to political objectives. This is evident given the 
military as an instrument of political will. Based on this, viable outcomes is best 
conceptualised as establishing a condition from which political outcomes can be 
decided. This means that focus is on gradual positive change of the operation 
environment instead of outright and decisive victory. To conceptualise positive 
outcomes, the Measuring Progress In Conflict Environments framework is 
applied, which determines progress by using various indicators to measure 
domestic political institutional capacity and drivers of conflict. Outcomes are thus 
deemed positive if they reduce drivers of conflict or increase domestic 
institutional capacity, or both. The dilemma in the contemporary setting is to 
balance the reduction of conflict drivers with the building of domestic institutional 
capacity, so that sustainable peace becomes possible when the institutional 
capacity to resolve conflict prevails over conflict drivers.  
 
Selection of case 
 
Based on these assertions, the UN Mission In Liberia (UNMIL) is selected as a 
case, given that it fulfils the traits of an intervention with an integrated approach, 
and is therefore a case most likely to exhibit the link between cooperation and 
positive outcomes, enabling a specification of the hypothesis. The period studied 
is the transition period from the start of the intervention in October 2003 to the 
inauguration of a democratically elected government, replacing the transition 
government in January 2006.  
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Analytical framework 
 
The analytical framework is the concrete operative tool for the analysis, based on 
the method of process-tracing and the assertions made from the theoretical 
background. It treats the intervention as a multi-actor implementation process, and 
focus on interaction between the dynamic operation environment, functioning as 
an enabling or constraining framework, and the planning and implementation of 
the intervening actors in the production of outcomes, where outcomes are 
conceptualised as gradual change. The model advances over time in analytical 
phases, where each phase is focused on change in the operation environment 
framework (OEF) via activities of planning/decision-making, implementation, 
output and outcome.  A new phase commences when a significant change has 
come about, that means a renegotiation of the preconditions for action. This 
means that the phases can cover varying temporal space, but are chronologically 
ordered, making process tracing over time possible. The Measuring Progress In 
Conflict Environment framework is used to evaluate outcomes in each phase 
based on the criteria stipulated above, making it possible to trace progress across 
phases. This makes it possible to trace gradual change of the operation 
environment, judge if the outcome was positive, and single out the role of 
cooperation and integration in the convergence of many aspects to produce 
outcome, providing with the necessary tools to answer the research question. The 
framework is illustrated in a figure below. The model is read from top to bottom 
and left to right. 
 
 
 
Analysis of the transition period, October 2003 – 
January 2006 
 
The analysis is divided into three phases, where the first phase focus on the 
deployment of the mission and the start-up of the disarmament, demobilisation, 
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rehabilitation and reintegration programme that targets ex-combatants. The 
second phase commences when the operation environment is changed positively 
due to the enabling security umbrella the deployment causes, and focus on 
activities within four crucial programmes that can commence on a large scale due 
to the enabling security structure.  These programmes are: Disarmament, 
demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration, humanitarian aid, establishing the 
rule of law, and election planning. The third phase commences when the 
disarmament and demobilisation activities are concluded, which means that armed 
factions are disbanded and the conflict dynamics change to a non-violent political 
shape, which motivates a shift of phase. The third and final phase of the transition 
period is focused on the final planning and implementation of elections, which 
means that the transition government is removed and replaced by a democratically 
elected one. The end of the disarmament and demobilisation process and the 
advancements made in the other programmes enables this. Programmes continue 
during this phase, converging in impact to enable elections.  
 
In the first phase it was noted that coordination mainly had a facilitating impact on 
the operational level, in concrete mission settings on the ground with a clear, 
achievable outcome. Deployment was mainly planned and implemented through a 
single UN department. Delays in the deployment implementation hampered the 
disarmament and demobilisation start-up, with the consequence that the 
programme was postponed until conditions and planning was more stable.  
 
In the second phase, a pattern of cooperative action in relation to positive 
outcomes begins to emerge. Form follows function, and where there are technical 
issues to be coordinated, cooperation delivers good results, even under a lack of 
funding and political constraints. However, the lack of overall strategic coherence, 
the weak performance of the Liberian transition government, and lack of funds 
impede these impacts. There is a holistic casual process at the strategic level 
constraining the impacts made at the operational level. However, the momentum 
gained at the operational level has enabled the planning of elections to pick up 
speed, and the progress made feeds into each other. Overall, this operational 
progress lays the ground for the accelerated elections preparations.  
 
In the third phase, it is clear that the holding of free and fair elections, resulting in 
the removal of the transition government is a milestone in the path towards viable 
peace. This impact clearly enables the continued work for UNMIL and the new 
government, as the transition government was a main constrainer, and a primary 
conflict driver in Liberia’s war was bad governance. The role of cooperation was 
quite outstanding in the contribution to positive outcomes, as stakeholders 
cooperating to a large extent, made the election process and repatriation of refuges 
possible through effective coordination. The pattern still stands that form follows 
function and coordination is brought to its full potential in the handling of 
technical issues. The convergence of impacts towards elections was also 
consistent with this pattern, as effort where coordinated to a clear and achievable 
aim set in time.  
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The overall progress in the transition period is positive, with the culmination 
being free and fair elections, enabling continued development towards sustainable 
peace. However, key areas remain to be consolidated, not least the establishment 
of rule of law, economic sustainability and state authority through Liberia, to 
ensure viable and subsequent self-sustaining peace. The pattern seems to be that 
UNMIL fared much better in reducing conflict drivers than in strengthening 
institutional capacity. This is partly explainable by the period studied being a 
transition phase, and naturally focus is firstly on establishing favourable 
conditions, but the link between security and development manifests as failure to 
strengthen institutional capacity will nullify the reduction of conflict drivers in the 
long-term impacts. This highlights the dilemma of reducing conflict drivers and 
strengthening institutional capacity at the same time. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, the role of cooperation, enabled by integrated command structures, 
is a primary variable in the production of positive impacts in the operational 
setting, where there is a clear and achievable short-term outcome and form 
follows function. The lack of coherence at the strategic level, in conjunction with 
lack of funding and weak political support, hampers the transition from short-term 
partial gains to sustainable and holistic positive impact. Lack of funding and bad 
governance is primary drivers while the lack of strategic coherence intervenes and 
acerbates these structural constraints.   
 
Based on the conclusions identified above, the specification of the hypothesis is 
formulated in the following way: 
 
Cooperation, enabled by integrated command structures, will lead to positive 
outcomes on the operative level where there is a clear and achievable short-term 
aim. Lack of coherence at the strategic level will hamper the transition to long-
term, sustainable positive outcomes, enforcing the primary drivers, lack of 
funding and bad governance. 
 
This hypothesis can now be lifted to new cases to be further validated, 
complemented, or rejected. 
 
The analytical model used proved to be a useful for process-tracing and 
disentangling individual aspect’s impact. However, it needs to be supported with 
evaluation tools such as the Measuring Progress In Conflict Environment 
framework, as it is primary designed for monitoring and tracing a process. It could 
be useful as a tool for process tracing in many areas, given that appropriate 
evaluation tools are added. Tools for monitoring and evaluation should continue 
to be the focus for research, as it is imperative for developing future peace support 
operations.  
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Quite alarming is the lack of strategic coherence, because this was a most likely 
case. This suggests that the strategic deficit and the weak link between the 
strategic and operational setting is strongly validated.  
 
A key policy focus should therefore be to develop shared understandings and 
enabling institutional mechanisms that fosters coherence over the ends, ways and 
means early or even prior to future operations.  
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